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FOREWORD TO STUDY
ANALYZING GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE
In the summer of 1973 the U. S. Department of State awarded a
contract to the M. I. T. Center for International Studies to conduct a
year-long study that would, in the words of the R. F. P. , "describe
evolving patterns of interdependence in a multipolar world.and develop
new methods for projecting and appraising such patterns. "
Given a projected level of effort of only nine professional man-
months for the study, our governing research principle was to make
maximum use of existing comparative advantages of the researchers
involved, drawing to the greatest extent possible on previous or con-
current work they and their graduate students were doing. (It must
however be said that all of us found ourselves entering new intellectual
ground as our research proceeded.)
It was thus agreed that Professor Hayward R. Alker, Jr., would
review the scholarly literature for issues, themes, approaches, and
problems bearing on interdependence, and that he would also take
responsibility for drawing conclusions concerning appropriate research
methodologies. Professor Alker, drawing on substantial research
papers on specific scholarly controversies, prepared (with Ann Alker)
Chapter II of Volume I of the report. His methodological review
appears as Volume III, in which Professor Nazli Choucri has coauthored
the concluding chapter. Among the working papers developed in the
course of that part of the project were the following, which are avail-
able on request from the M. I. T. Center for International Studies:
Lily Gardner, "Interdependence, Independence, Dependence,
and Integration: Whither Western Europe?"
Fabio Basagni, "The New 'Political Economy' Controversy"
Ann Alker, "The Limits to Growth Controversy"
Richard Kugler, "Strategists and Their Critics: The United
States National Security Policy Controversy"
v
Professor Nazli Choucri took responsibility for developing a case
study on energy interdependence, with some focus on the Middle East,
that would serve the threefold purposes of: suggesting and applying an
approach potentially useful in other sectors or geographic regions;
illustrating some of the analytical problems, issues, and findings
typical of scholarly interdependence controversies; and supplying
some policy-relevant insights. Her report is bound separately as
Volume H of the report. Professor Choucri also coauthored Chap-
ter IV of Volume III. She was assisted throughout her study by
Vincent Ferraro, who contributed valuable research assistance,
editorial help, and substantive criticism. Chapter V of Volume II
was written with the collaboration of Ijaz Gilani. Major working
papers, also available on request, are:
Vincent Ferraro, "Competing Transnational Energy Regimes"
Ijaz Gilani, "Interdependence and Community- Building Among
Competing Regimes of the Arab World"
The third dimension of the study was the chief preoccupation of
the undersigned, who also acted as coordinator of the project. My
own approach follows a generally policy-oriented perspective. In
Chapter I of Volume I, I sought to parse out the meaning of inter-
dependence so that it might be approached with more clarity; in Chap-
ter III, I endeavored to offer the outlines of a policy analysis leading
to conclusions- -which are my own--regarding some desirable policy
directions. In the course of this research I asked Ann Alker to prepare
a brief background paper on U. S. Nonfuel Mineral Import Practices,
which as a useful assembly of data is included as Appendix A to Volume
I. I also asked Steve R. Pieczenik, who in addition to being a practi-
cing psychiatrist is a doctoral condidate in the M. I. T. Department of
Political Science, to see what possibly relevant insights concerning
dependency situations might be drawn from the psychiatric literature.
His brief but provocative response is also included, as Appendix B
to Volume I.
Although final responsibility remains with the cited authors, each
of the principal authors read and commented on each other's contri-
butions for this report, and we are all grateful for the help so received.
Dr. Choucri and I benefited from the helpful criticisms of our draft
chapters by David A. Kay and Amelia C. Leis s, and I further profited
from a review of my chapters by William Diebold, Jr. Professor
Alker's work was critiqued in preliminary form by Robert 0. Keohane
and Ramkrishna Mukherjee. His research for Chapter III of Volume III
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was assisted by Scott Ross. Finally, we had the opportunity to consider
numerous comments from officers of the Department of State who
reviewed the report in draft form.
While the contract did not call for a summary to be prepared, I
increasingly felt the need for one, given the complexity of the subject
matter and the fact that, despite the project's modest size, we were
producing considerably more written material than we had anticipated.
We therefore commissioned Irirangi C. Bloomfield, who has in the past
performed numerous precis and editorial tasks for the Center, to pre-
pare a summary volume, which we have denominated Volume IV.
My colleagues and I are grateful to Pio D. Uliassi of INR/XR
for his tactful and understanding performance of the role of Project
Monitor. We are very indebted to Jeanne Amnotte and to Dovianna
Barrens, who succeeded her, for devoted and skillful handling of the
manifold tasks of Project Secretary.
Lincoln P. Bloomfield
Project Director
Cambridge, Massachusetts
November 1974
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CHAPTER I
A METHODOLOGY FOR INTERDEPENDENCE RESEARCH
by
Hayward R. Alker, Jr.
A. Outstanding Questions
The present volume attempts to shed light on the research issues
raised by the previous volumes. The range of these questions is
enormous: How should we conceptualize, measure, and evaluate inter-
dependence costs, benefits, balances, asymmetries, and deficits ?
What are the relevant subjective and objective trends in international
security, political economy, ecology, and community-building rela-
tions, including their underlying conditions, causes, and determinative
structures? What future developments are likely, desirable, undesir-
able, possible, and at what costs to whom? Within the realm of
governmental policy-making, what strategies of interdependence
should be considered or advocated involving what actions, by whom,
in what order, with what institutional bases? Surely appropriate
answers depend on more or less adequate assessments of policy effec-
tiveness, unintended outcomes, and the longer run institutional and
environmental effects of both official and unofficial actions.
It shouldbe clear that our brief research efforts in the earlier
volumes have not definitively answered these questions. Consider but
a few obvious examples. Chapter I and Appendix B, Volume I, high-
light subjective features of dependency, while the dependency theorists
mentioned there and in Chapter II, Volume I, emphasize objective,
structural constraints on autonomous action. To what extent can both
be right? The extraordinarily difficult analytic problem of "netting
out" multi-issue cross-sectoral imbalances and their consequences
has been identified, but remains unresolved in theory and practice.
Both preceding volumes do succeed in insightfully revealing many of
the complexities of the subject, but reliable and valid procedures for
resolving these issues do not exist. Only piecemeal or judgmental
relevance could at most be claimed.
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Although all three principal authors of the present report favor
selectively internationalizing various aspects of energy relations,
the range of possible substantive and institutional foci for collaborative
action revealed by Volumes I and II also precludes definitive assess-
ment. Which energy regime alternatives among those considered in
Volumes I and II should most vigorously be pursued? What are the
underlying causes and constraints, the net benefits and costs associated
with the dramatic change in relations among oil producers and con-
sumers graphically portrayed in Volume II? Which arrangements
would best lessen the strains arising from asymmetric dependencies?
If, as Professor Bloomfield persuasively argues, complete
autarky is either impossible with desirable cost limits or historically
counterproductive (cf. Figure 1, Volume III), where does the optimum
exist in a generally attractive, but noninternational, strategy of
lessening American, Canadian, and LDC dependency? Certainly the
liberal ideas and ideals underlying these goals are not self-evident;
they deserve reexamination and respecification.
B. Reasons for a Methodological Study
The above questions are designed not to criticize the earlier
volumes, but to justify the need for further research on these and
related questions. The present volume is but a small, methodological
contribution to that effort. If more research is needed, we must ask
the methodological question: how ought such research proceed? Such
needs were also recognized in the original request for proposal, which
asked for a review of concepts as well as "Techniques for Analyzing .
Global Interdependence." Here, then, are three obvious and sufficient
reasons for the present volume: (1) the existence of important but
unanswered research questions; (2) the need for a review of research
methods and techniques relevant to the study of interdependence; and
(3) the subsequent articulation of a research focus implied by increases
in our collective understanding of what ought to be studied and how that
study might be accomplished.
Underlying the need for research on "evolving patterns of global
interdependence" is a more general two-way process. Governmental
agencies want to suggest priority concerns for interested scholars
and to learn more from research that is relevant to their concerns.
Scholars seek recognition and stimulation for their work and oppor-
tunities to influence governmental thinking and action. The present
volume is also designed to contribute to a second objective: the
improvement of this two-way communication process.
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C. The Methodological Strategy
Methodology is philosophy of research, applied epistemology.
In a criticism-conscious fashion, it seeks to articulate persuasive,
coherent, and feasible arguments about how research ought to be
practiced. Research methods such as content analysis, gaming or
computer simulation, may be thought of as clusters of operational
research techniques and associated rationales for their differential
utilization. As a research method, content analysis, for example,
includes: techniques of automated tagging procedures used in docu-
ment routing/retrieval systems; general inquirer computer routines;
thematic coding procedures useful for scholarly or intelligence pur-
poses; and manual techniques directed toward more intensive, particu-
laristic analyses of source intentions and beliefs. The well-trained
content analyst has also developed considerable sophistication concern-
ing the applicability of such techniques to different problem contexts
and the weaknesses and strengths of various ways of interpreting the
results of such technical research.
Methodology comes between unanswered research questions and
the choice among or invention of appropriate research techniques.
Therefore a methodology is needed to assess the relevance of particular
research techniques for interdependence research. And, explicitily
articulated and agreed-upon methodologies are a prerequisite of fruit-
ful communication among researchers as well as between governmental
agencies and research scholars. When such do not exist, communica-
is frequently and confusingly at cross-purposes.
The strategy of exposition of the present volume is therefore as
follows. First, in Chapter II, an effort will be made to find a set of
analytical problems common to the very different scholarly perspec-
tives reviewed in Chapter II, Volume I. Without any claims of unique-
ness, an eclectic, partially synthetic methodological approach will
then be offered in the second half of Chapter II as a relevant methodo-
logical focus for interdependence research. The validity of such a
synthesis depends, however, on a deeper level of scholarly under-
standing.than was provided in Chapter II of Volume I. Its relevance to
the previously mentioned common analytical problems will nonetheless
be argued. And its compatibility with Professor Bloomfield's policy/
bureaucracy perspective will be partially demonstrated.
Then, in Chapter III, this methodological focus will be further
articulated in terms of canons (maxims) of methodological relevance
sufficiently precise to allow judgments of approach/technique relevance
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to interdependence research. Chapter III concludes with a review of
several dozen technical academic studies particularly relevant to
interdependence research, giving special attention to previous research
by Professors Alker, Bloomfield, and Choucri. Some general metho-
dological conclusions follow about matching research techniques to
interdependence research needs.
It is not expected that such a review can totally be grasped by
those unfamiliar with the technical research studies in question. None-
theless, a short report such as this must assume such familiarity.
The review of techniques in Chapter III may thus seem more oriented
toward practicing research scholars contemplating interdependence
problems than toward government analyses. It, however, is hoped
that the multilevel analytical conceptualization of interdependence
phenomena in Chapter IV will be generally intelligible. It is my con-
viction that the application of that scheme or some other equally clear
conceptualization would help to sharpen the analysis underlying official
pronouncements on interdependence, as reviewed and preliminarily
classified in Bloomfield's Chapter I, Volume I. Professor Bloomfield's
own definition and measures of interdependence will also be shown to
be an important special case of this more general conceptualization.
The final chapter, Chapter IV, then aggregates the methodological
maxims of Chapter III. To the extent that the methodological approach
of Section B of Chapter II is found by government analysts to be a help-
ful one, these maxims can be useful as a list of twenty questions to
ask throughout the public sector in reviewing research proposals for
interdependence relevance.
In order to provide a concrete example of what is implied by the
methodological perspective of Chapters II and III, the concluding chap-
ter illustrates as well the steps that should be taken in studying energy
interdependencies. This final chapter, coauthored with Professor
Choucri, thus provides an opportunity for articulating the methodo-
logical insights gained from the energy case study of Volume II and
reconciling them with the present approach without limiting the rele-
vance of this volume's methodological orientation. This outline
suggests a particular kind of research needing further Department
investigation. That such relevance is possible in other areas of
research, including commodity interdependencies, will be the final
argument of the present volume.
CHAPTER II
COMMON ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS:
A PARTIALLY SYNTHETIC APPROACH
by
Hayward R. Alker, Jr.
This chapter will suggest a partially synthetic methodological
approach to a series of analytical problems commonly found in the
controversies, issues, and policy options reviewed in Volumes I and
II of this report. To be responsive to such concerns without prejuding
the major issues, a broad synthetic framework is called for. But no
such effort is' completely inclusive, hence the partial nature of the
present effort. What appears to be needed is a design-oriented,
historical systems approach focused on cross-state world order possi-
bilities, emphasizing competing quasi-regime alternatives. The
elucidation and justification of this methodological orientation depends
on its relevance to analytical problems in each of the previously
studied issue areas. Subsequent chapters will articulate and apply this
approach to the review and development of issue-specific research
designs and techniques.
A. Common Analytical Problems in Interdependence Issues
The analytical problems we extract come from the scholarly
interdependence controversies of Chapter II, Volume I, as well as
the energy case of Volume II, and the policy options delineated in
Chapter III, Volume I. They derive mainly from the perceived growing
complexity of global politics. This involves more actors with more
objectives, increasingly sensitive to others' actions, unilaterally
controlling fewer relevant instruments. Actors are often subject to
greater environmental constraints and are immersed in a larger
number of policy issues, many of them with fundamental structural
implications, requiring joint actions for their resolution. Positively
put, these complexities of a post-Cold War era provide new opportuni-
ties for individual or collective action.
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Without having empirically validated such positive or negative
interpretations, we can still define the core analytical problem. Bloom-
field's conclusion to Chapter I, Volume I, suggests the key uncertainty:
" . the degree to which one is reciprocally dependent on others for
what things of value, at what cost to one or both, with what benefits to
one or both, and with what implications for other aspects of foreign
policy or domestic life. " Given the increased relevance of other
actors in achieving both domestic and international objectives, it seems
much harder, but more necessary in today's increasingly complex
world scene from a variety of official and nonofficial perspectives, to
answer the slightly more general questions: who gets, or should get,
what, why, how, at what cost, when, with what (perhaps unintended)
side effects ? In subsequent pages, we shall break down this problem
into some of its most important parts.
But before doing so, it is worth reemphasizing the structure-
sensitive aspects of interdependence issues and options. It is hard to
reconcile policy analysis orientations assuming fixed global structures
with design concerns directed toward structure change. Each of
Volume I's scholarly controversies, Professor Bloomfield's policy
perspective, and the energy case of Volume II evidenced growing con-
cern with designing and implementing new, if partial, world orders:
system strategies for restructuring policies, transactions, interests,
relationships, and regulative institutions so that objectives might be
realized in a mutually satisfactory, hence orderly and enduring, fashion.
In these areas normal policies continually run into structural
issues. Consider "normal" examples from Volume I: armaments
development policies, inflation, or payments controls end run by multi-
national banks or corporations, commercial fishing practices, American-
Canadian pipeline development (to take a case of troubled pluralistic
regional integration closer to home than Europe), or atomic energy
technology transfers. Structurally speaking, we must worry about
unstable arms races, the breakdown of global monetary control systems,
Canadian dependency, and Middle East security. Two (Chapter III,
Volume I) of the main classes of policy options (reducing risks and
using asymmetric interdependencies for bargaining purposes) assumed
relatively fixed overall dependency patterns, while other policy options
were system-changing strategies (reducing risks, reducing dependency,
increasing authority or increasing mutual dependency). A closer look
within even the "normal" options, however, sustains the point that
the success of even "normal" interdependence policy options is often
structure dependent.
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1. Mixed Interest, Interaction-Contingent, Collective Outcome
Dilemmas
The first analytical problem common to each of the substantive
areas we have reviewed is that they are mixed interest, interaction-
contingent, collective outcome dilemmas. Such problems have fre-
quently been discussed under labels like the game of Chicken or
Prisoner's Dilemma. A few paragraphs are necessary to articulate
their essential characteristics. 1
Such games are usually represented in normal form:
Actor B
Policy Strategy
Option 1
Actor A
Policy Strategy
Option 2
1 A longer, often insightful exposition of their relevance to U. S. -
U.S.S.R. security relations is Glenn H. Snyder, "'Prisoner's Dilemma'
and 'Chicken Models' in International Politics, " International Studies
Quarterly 15 (March 1971), pp. 66-103. See also Thomas Schelling,
"A Framework for the Evaluation of Arms Proposals, " Discussion
Paper No. 210, Public Policy Program, Kennedy School of Govern-
ment, Harvard University (January 1974). It should be added that,
were our exposition to focus on the "chicken" analogy (which has
lower payoffs for cooperation), more attention would be given to the
bluffs and threats often characteristic of conflictful situations.
Option 1 Option 2
Outcome1 i Outcome1 2
(UAsi ~i (UA2,U
Outcome 2 1  Outcome 2 2
(UA21, U~ 1 ) (UAZ2 , U22)
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The four cells represent different outcome possibilities and contain
the utility payoffs associated with different choices of the strategic
options available to players A and B.
In the Prisoner's Dilemma interpretation of such a simple game,
the District Attorney faces two apprehended prisoners (A and B), held
incommunicado from each other, with the options of confessing or not
confessing the whereabouts of "the stolen goods. " If either confesses
singly, turning state's evidence produces a historical record, and
brings him a high reward, such as a suspended sentence; the other gets
the book thrown at him. Both confessing means they get convicted
with something less than the worst sentence; both not confessing means
the District Attorney cannot find "the stolen goods" and can only get
convictions and jail sentences for a lesser charge, such as breaking
and entering.
A typical "payoff matrix" in this case (and others similar to it)
looks like:
B
don't
confess /arm/overfish confess /arm /overfish
don't
confess /arm/overfish
A
confess /arm/overfish
It becomes very clear upon reflection that the independently acting
prisoner will be sorely tempted (even rationally encouraged in an
economic sense) to confess or "rat on" or try to "sucker" the other
prisoner he cannot talk to, make enforceable agreements with, or
trust. Yet independent utility maximization in these terms is mutually
defeating: a cooperative outcome is clearly preferred by both. The
5, 5 -10,10
DA ignorant, lesser A gets suckered by
sentences, etc. B, etc.
10,-10 -5,-5
B gets suckered by Long jail sentence
A, etc. for- both, etc.
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same dilemma may well occur in some arms acquisitions, fishing,
inflation control, or oil production situations.
The fact that the structuring of these outcomes can be described
both collectively (joint conviction on a less er charge, balanced or
unbalanced arms levels, total catch magnitudes) or individually (who
goes to jail, who has which arms the other does not, who gets what
from their inflation controller or oil production policies) would be
obscured by the normal game-theoretic schematization, which only
puts utilities in each of the four outcome cells. But in interdependence
thinking the distinction between collective outcome possibilities and
individual ones is important: depletions of ocean stocks, District
Attorney ignorance about the location of the stolen goods, or the
existence of global inflation controls are shared by everyone whether
they like them or can control them. Idealized, such wholistic or
systemic outcomes are called pure public (or collective)goods or bads:
one's consumption of them does not diminish another's. It may also
be impossible to prevent such consumption or impossible to get paid
for producing such goods. At the level of individual actors, collective
outcomes generate what we shall call consumption interdependence.
Institutional liberals usually argue that governmental effort (or
binding agreements among prisoners afraid of getting the book) is
necessary to produce efficient amounts of such goods because of another
collective feature, "imperfections" in their property titles. Not enough
collective goods and too many public bads are produced when coercively
effective tax or agreement structures do not exist. Ruggie claims that
the increased pursuit of pure or impure public goods (including regula-
tions of public bads) is a characteristic of modern, post-industrial
societies at the national or international levels. 2
Now let us show how the production of goods with collective out-
come aspects can involve interaction contingencies. If it is the case
that 012 is different from Ol (and/or 022 different from 021) we say
that Prisoner A's strategy alternatives are interaction contingent with
B's. He is not independently able to control his outcomes (whether or
not he goes to jail and for how long). One could also extend the idea
of interaction contingency to analogous complications arising from
separate actions taken by the same actor to achieve different objectives.
2 John Gerard Ruggie, "Collective Goods and Future International
Collaboration, " American Political Science Review 66 (1972), pp. 874-
893, at p. 874.
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Interaction contingency is a causal matter. Measurable in terms of
the magnitudes of the differences involved, A's causal dependence on
B may be greater or less. It often has a historical dimension. Thus
A's actions (and B's) are not additive in their effects in jointly con-
tingent situations. Causal interdependence here refers to mutual or
reciprocal causal dependency. 3
Similar claims that international autonomy in monetary matters
is decreasing, that deep sea fishing alternatives are more contingent,
that A's oil volume-price production options are causally dependent
on B all derive from prior assumptions about the causal rubrics and
historically implicit ground rules of their natural and social (including
economic) environments. This is the second very general structural
level of which it is meaningful to talk about international interdependence
as interaction contingency.
Differences in individual capabilities to affect outcomes over
which A and B have differential preferences allow definitions, like
those in Volume I, of situations of asymmetric sensitivity interdepen-
dence (B's possible effects on A's jail terms are of a greater magni-
tude than A's) and balanced sensitivity interdependence (the case of
equal effects). Recalling Cooper's usage in this regard, 4 think of
A's anti-inflationary strategies affecting B's control possibilities and
vice versa. We do not have to know precisely what national inflation-
growth trade-offs exist to recognize sensitivity interdependence.
One could go further and talk more precisely and teleologically
about the functional interdependence necessary for producing and
ensuring individual or collective goods. To do so assumes a third
level of structured relations, that of productive tasks and operational
practices and ordinary game play. These in turn may further be
governed by more or less institutionalized generative /regulative
norms and values, which I distinguish as a fourth level of analysis.
New or renewed game rules, for example, belong at this level of
analysis. So do novel, collectively produced solutions to consumption
externalities that were public bads.
3 A sophisticated statistical literature exists on interdependent
systems, sets of causal relations in general characterizeable as simul-
taneous and in part as reciprocal and controllable dependencies. See
Hayward R. Alker, Jr. , "Causal Inference and Political Analysis," in
Mathematical Applications in Political Science, vol. 2, ed. Joseph Bernd
(Dallas: SMU Press, 1966).
4 Richard Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1968).
-11-
Scholars analyzing repeated game practices systematically intro-
duce utilities on preferred or disliked outcome possibilities for
theoretical and measurement purposes; actors usually do so more or
less implicitly for comparative, productive purposes. We can
characterize mixed interest situations in terms of the interdependence
of utility interests. We shall do this in a way consistent with prior
definitions of consumption interdependence, causal interdependence,
sensitivity interdependence, and functional interdependence. Let
UAij = UA(Oig) = UA(Ai, Bj, Ck) be the utility A places on the outcome
Oij associated with A taking action i and B following strategy j in
natural and social causal context C. Recall how Volume I summarized
debates about the sign or extent of the covariance of actor utilities
over available action alternatives. For example, this was more
positive among the United States and its allies in a time of high insecu-
rity. Mixed interest situations are those with neither purely positive
or purely negative interest interdependence. A and B are positively
interest interdependent (have no conflict of interest) when each one's
action possibilities leading to his own higher utilities also enhance the
other's utility payoffs. 5 Negative interest interdependence, like pure
conflict situations, suggests that when one nation does well, another
does poorly. Mixed interest situations come somewhere in between.
Now we make the main point: each of the issue areas we have
examined in Volumes I and II has important analytical problems
characterizable as mixed interest, interaction-contingent, collective
outcome dilemmas. Cooper's review of GATT as a self-denying
ordinance designed to prevent Prisoner's Dilemmas, like the tariff/
5 A rigorous definition of conflict of interest is given in Robert
Axelrod, Conflict of Interest (Chicago: Markham, 1970). It allows
measures of degrees of conflict of interest in the case where inter-
personal comparisons of utility are possible. "Interests" can then be
defined and compared in terms of contemplated or actual utility payoff
possibilities. The textual definition above does not require such com-
parisons, being defined in correlational terms, but can be easily
extended to such a case. We have also avoided discussing the interest-
ing case (sometimes called utility interdependence) in which one actor's
utility assessment of outcomes depends on another's assessment.
Rivalry and sympathy usually generate such interdependence.
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devaluation wars of the 1930s, fits well here. 6 Ruggie's treatment
of international organizations as public goods providers7 sometimes
responding to the externalities of new technologies generalizes one
frequently offered resolution of the Prisoner's Dilemma. The collec-
tive good here, like nondefection to the District Attorney, is usually
thought of as a viable regime of technology regulation. Related
theoretical developments are used by Olson and Zeckhauser to esti-
mate "fair" alliance cost shares, and by Russett and Sullivan to
reconceptualize integration studies. Kissinger's 1968 thoughts about
designing a world security system have a very similar flavor,
reflected in Harrison Wagner's qualified assertion that national secu-
rity is a public good sharedmore or less equally among a nation's
citizens. Brian Pollins has argued that producer attempts individually
to determine oil prices before 1970 produced collective bads (from the
point of view of national producers). Arms race theorists might
-similarly wonder, with Glenn Snyder, if detente might be seen in the
same terms. Dennis Meadows' valiant efforts to square Forrester's
Malthusian circle appear to exhibit a similar inclination. Hardin's
"Tragedy of the Commons" represents a clearer version of the Pri-
soner's Dilemma problem in an ecological case, even though the
compellingness of appeals to global ecological balance is often debated. 9
Pollution-controlling nations might then be considered loosers playing
Chicken!
2. Pervasive Units of Analysis Problem
The need simultaneously to consider policy/structure dimensions
has another immediate consequence. With the increasing importance
6Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence.
7 Ruggie, "Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration."
8 Brian Pollins, "Transnational Oil Regimes: The Prisoner's
Dilemma Game as a Descriptive Model and the Cooperative Solution
as a Collective Good" (Cambridge: M. I. T., 1974), unpublished. The
Olson- Zeckhauser paper and the Russett-Sullivan update have been
discussed in recent issues of International Organization. Wagner's
work is as yet unpublished.
9 References to these latter issues are given in Ann Alker's
project paper on "The Limits to Growth Controversy" (Cambridge:
M.I.T., 1973), unpublished.
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of transnational and transgovernmental actors, the pluralization of
recognizable international issues and the increase in identity /loyalty
conflicts (noted in Volume I, Chapter II) have generated a pervasive
unit of analysis problem. Whose interests, at what level of analysis,
should we consider? The different levels of structural analyses implicit
in collective outcome dilemmas highlight the problem. If we are look-
ing for emergent creative/regulative political orders, or opportunities
for some such possibilities, it is clear methodologically that our
studies must be done at close to a global normative level of analysis.
To the extent that existing forms of supranational, transgovernmental,
governmental, or transnational actors have collective identities, capa-
bilities, and generative/regulative purposes informing current policies
and operational practices, they too must be considered. This larger
collection of relevant units we refer to as cross-state actors. Compet-
ing, parochial, functionally limited, weakly coordinated approaches
to world order-building are in part consequences of d4tente-accelerated
pluralization of cross-state actors with different identities and loyalties.
Because the formal, legal organization of international relations
does not correspond to its political organization, we need cross-state
data. For example, we need a lot more information on order-building
efforts than the texts of treaties signed by foreign ministers. Questions
arise like: Which actors in the illegal "nonwars" should negotiate their
settlements? Are the dominated groups in center /periphery linkages
entitled to positions at the conference table or in the policy analysis
calculus ? What about bureaucratic changes within national actors or
transnational guerrilla groups that help or hamper larger regional
accommodation efforts so necessary if Middle Eastern stability is to
underlie secure oil flows?
3. The Need for Comparative Costing of Multiple Objectives
Just as the focus on policy outcomes plus structural effects high-
lights units of analysis problems in the contemporary world, so it
complicates the comparative costing of multiple objectives. It has
always been difficult to assess the foreign policy options of world
political actors because foreign policy opportunity costs are more
important than monetary costs. The interdependence literature high-
lights a related need: making commensurable narrow, short-run
policy payoffs and broader, larger run order-building efforts. Resource
costs and opportunity costs are involved. Interpersonal comparisons
must go into political designs as well. Multiple objectives follow from
the multiple interests of sensitivity-interdependent multiple actors
whose relevance we have already noted. Political economy controversies,
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and related research paradigms, are similarly driven by different
commitments to the values of autonomy, efficiency, and equity.
Bloomfield's policy analysis in Volume I highlighted a "balance" norm
involving both autonomy, capability, and equity aspects. But evalua-
ting objectives comparatively does not answer the question of which
objectives to pursue and which policy instruments to develop or use
to what extent. Here another analytical problem commonly arises,
as already noted in Volume I.
4. The Instruments -Objectives Constraint
A fourth core problem, the instruments-objectives constraint,
has its intellectual origins in the cybernetic law of requisite variety.
One version of this constraint states that there must be as many
independent policy instruments as there are objectives if success is
to be hoped for. Cooper has argued this point in the context of multi-
plying economic objectives (growth, low inflation, high employment,
good balance of payments, and free world economic integration), and
increased U. S. sensitivity to foreign economies. Supranational neo-
functional technocrats rely on the inability of merely national policy
instruments for the weak and their possibilities of task expansion.
Military debates about strategic deterrence plus damage limitation
plus theater-specific deterrence plus maintaining a strong military/
industrial power base repeatedly bedevil those trying to make efficient
budgetary allocations for national security. Which highly improbable
scenarios should we worry about with respect to these objectives is
another complicating aspect of the instruments-objective problem in
the military security case. The unavailability of globally effective
governmental policy instruments is a major reason why Forrester
prefers a retreat to more locally and autonomous management of
national eco-systems. It may also account for the limited success
of coordination/regulation efforts in nonisolatable international sub-
systems. Such discussions of policy and structure alternatives cannot
avoid complex inference questions about the underlying environment
and historical-causal interdependencies; they will not be resolved
without consistent, sufficiently articulated and flexibly administratable
policy goals.
5. The Likelihood of Unanticipated Negative Consequences
A fifth analytical problem, the likelihood of unanticipated nega-
tive consequences, has been capsulized in Forrester's remarks about
population control policies and the counter-intuitive behavior of non-
linear, circularly causal social systems. Highly technical work by
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Ando-Fisher-Simon on interdependent, nondecomposable systems
makes a similar point of direct relevance to the intimately connected,
but weakly coordinated, partial international systems noted above. 10
Forrester's notion of counter intuitive outcomes is usually linked to
a specific causal-historical idea of interaction contingency, called by
Forrester sectoral inderdependence: non-Malthusian population
control policies do not work because they feedback through the
economic sector as well,undermining the relevant incentive structures.
Simon's ideas are more closely related to the levels of operational
practice and institutional innovation or renewal. At these levels
organizational theorists and neofunctionalists stress the related idea
of functional interdependence. "The greater the specialization by sub-
programs . . . the greater the interdependence among organizational
sub-units. ''ll
Consider some more examples. From an integrationist per-
spective, Karl Deutsch has emphasized how operational war decisions
since about 1905 have frequently been self-defeating. 12 The ramifi-
cations of self-interested monetary devaluation decisions for the
larger economic order and national socioeconomic contexts seem to
have been analogously counterintuitive, requiring complex causal
understanding. Myrdal's vicious circles of development policies are
to be chosen. Energy policies designed to increase national autonomy
may be similarly self-defeating if they introduce greater functional
interdependencies in the nuclear energy field. From an alliance
theorist's perspective, the Kennedy/McNamara cancellation of Skybolt
for domestic reasons had perhaps as much effect on pushing Europe
toward a Gaullist design as the Soviet invasion of Hungary did on
Chinese rapprochement with the United States. 13 Radical critiques
of U. S. /U. S. S. R. high strategic interdependence, great power nuclear
war readiness and constant military mobilization have similarly argued
1 0 Albert Ando, Franklin Fisher, and Herbert Simon, Essays on
the Structure of Social Science Models (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1963).
1 1 James March and Herbert Simon, Organizations (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1955), p. 159.
1 2 Karl Deutsch, private communication.
1 3 Richard Neustadt, Alliance Politics.
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the counter-intuitive, latent-functions of competitive war readiness
in maintaining insecurity through armament.
6. The Need for Counterfactual Systems Assessment
These last examples immediately raise the question of counter-
factual systems assessment and suggest other kinds of interdependence,
simultaneously definable at the levels of sociocausal contexts, opera-
tional policies, and generative or regulative principles. Many analysts
speak in multilevel structural terms of systems of interdependence.
Normatively the realist wants to ask about whether there are feasible,
preferable, as yet nonexisting (and therefore counterfactual) alternatives
to vicious cycles of underdevelopment or insecurity. To say such sys-
tems are vicious is to imply, as Marxists would also agree, that there
are better alternatives available.
Structural sensitivity in these problem areas has got to go be-
yond the kinds of interdependence (of consumption, sensitivities, and
interests) we discussed concerning Prisoner's Dilemma and similar
mixed-interest, interaction- contingent, collective- outcome situations.
System effects, system costs, and the higher order causal processes
of system building, maintaining, and transformation are involved.
There are also structure-changing processes of inventing new strategy
options, breaking down communication barriers, changing game rules,
and redefining multi-objective utility functions that evaluate payoffs
and their structural contexts. Cost-conscious security and community
theorists talk in terms of mutual vulnerabilities. There is the need
to consider seriously whether the game should be played at all, how
frequently, for what stakes, and the costs of doing or not doing so.
Keohane and Nye define vulnerability interdependence in terms of the
opportunity costs of feasible transformations or terminations of mutual
systemic relationships. 14 Bloomfield's earlier discussion of regional
resource autarchy and self-sufficiency as a possible policy option again
implies the feasibility of such a counter-factual alternative.. Depen-
dency is par excellence the case of asymmetric vulnerability inter-
dependence: one nation could break a multilevel relationship with
relative ease; another could not.
1 4 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, "International Interdependence
and Integration, " in Handbook of Political Science, ed. Nelson Polsky
and Fred Greenstein (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, forthcoming).
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B. Components of a Partially Synthetic Methodological Approach
A brief review of analytical issues helps convince the methodo-
logical skeptic that important and difficult analytical problems can be
distinguished from political ones, even if their separation is always
less than total. Moreover, the frequent recognition of such problems
by scholars of different paradigmatic orientations in different content
areas of concern suggests both their centrality in the controversies
we have looked at, and their possible relevance to the "real world,"
seen so differently through opposed scholarly glasses.
Thus, we shall ground our methodological remarks in the above
list of analytical problems. Although resulting methodological develop-
ments will not solve political problems, there is some small hope--
to the extent that ideas move structures--that reconceptualizations of
various scientific and prescriptive questions may make possibilities
for governmental action more apparent, more genuine, more likely,
and more globally effective.
1. A Historical Systems Approach
The first component of a synthetic methodological approach
to interdependence issues, options, and problems is a historical
systems approach. By this I mean some combination of generalizing
historical analysis combined with the multilevel- structure- sensitive
viewpoint outlined above and the elaborations characteristic of modern
systems theory. Deutsch, Lenin, Hoffman, Morgenthau, have all
done exemplary studies of generalizing historical analyses. Forrester,
Haas, Kaplan, Rosecrance, and Young may be exemplary figures com-
bining the former and the latter systems theory and strategy interests. 1 5
More specifically, analyses of interdependent relationships
should be grounded in a historical context formally noted, but not
spelled out in our hypothetical Prisoner's Dilemma exercise. This
requires detailed attention to the substantive trends of the sort
mentioned briefly in Volume I, and more fully analyzed for the energy
case in Volume II of this report. This means historical variants in
1 5 A good feel for many of these perspectives would come from a
review of International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in
Research and Theory, ed. James Rosenau (New York: The Free Press,
1969).
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national, transnational, and trans governmental units of analysis must
be taken into account. Design alternatives, if they are to be at all
elaborated, should be based upon deep familiarities with relevant
histories and plausible precedents. A dynamic view of socio-
political processes should link inner objectives and constraints across
artificial interfaces with external environments. Such links are
always empirically important, and are now one of the current pre-
occupations of interdependence theorists.
Systems theories containing historically interpretable operational
rule specifications have enough precision for deductive or predictive
analyses of a Kaplan or Alker-Christensen-Greenberg sort16 and
allow design analyses using competing evaluative terms. More formally,
modern systems theories are developing vocabularies in terms of
which more partial research paradigms can be reformulated and com-
pared. They also provide measures of systemic "evolution" or
"adaptation" or "environmental transformation" necessary to make
sense out of world order issues.
2. A Focus on Partial World Order-Building Efforts
If a structurally sensitive historical systems approach
resonates with much of the previous discussion, a focus on partial
world order-building efforts has been only slightly less emphasized.
Identified in Chapter II, Volume I, as a surprisingly common pre-
occupation of both idealistic community builders and realistic power
manipulators, Marxists and Liberals, this emphasis was a main
concern of Volume II and Bloomfield's policy review.
Post-functionalists distinguish different spheres of interest
interdependence- -those where fragmentary community-building efforts
have a real basis in positively covering interests and those that do not,
somewhat like Herbert Spiro's previously described idea of inter-
dependence. Donald Puchala has defined "concordance systems" some-
where between cooperative integration and violent conflict such as the
1 6 A recent report on this research is Hayward Alker, Jr. , and
William Greenberg, "Analyzing Collective Security Regime Alternatives,"
forthcoming. Historical practices concerning interpretation and appli-
cation of collective security "precedents" give this research high
relevance to systems strategy analysis.
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Common Market "wherein actors find it possible consistently to
harmonize their interests, compromise their differences and reap
mutual rewards from their interactions. ,,17 The Intggrated Emergency
Program in Case of a New Interruption of Oil Supplies of the twelve-
member Energy Coordinating Group is perhaps the most recent example
of a partial world order-building effort at the level of regenerative
norms. Its key regulative rules are agreements in an emergency to
cut oil consumption by a common rate, to develop a common level of
emergency self-sufficiency and to combat selective embargos by
emergency reallocations. 18 Professor Bloomfield, in a related con-
text, has argued that "The major forces affecting human life on the
planet are increasing1 trans-national and require purposeful steps
toward world order. "i9
Perhaps the most articulated goal-concept of interdependence in
pluralistic world order terms is Miriam Camps processual definition:
(1) abatement of the arms race and progress toward disarmament;
(2) substitution of peaceful processes of change for violent ones; (3)
achievement of peaceful settlements of disputes through some kind of
decentralized collective security; (4) more efficient and ecologically
sound use of public and private global resources; (5) improvement in
economic welfare; (6) improvement in the quality of life; (7) some
narrowing of North-South wealth disparities; (8) some narrowing of
weak-strong power disparities; (9) protection and advancement of
human rights including the right to individual and collective diversity
and autonomy. 20 With different emphases and different conceptual
interpretations, conservatives, liberals, and radicals from North and
South talk about most of these same interdependence objectives, at
least regionally or globally.
17 Donald J. Puchala, "Of Blind Men, Elephants, and International
Integration, " Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 10, no. 3 (1972),
p. 277.
1 8 U. S. , Department of State, "Integrated Emergency Program
in Case of a New Interruption of Oil Supplies" (Typewritten, n. d.)
1 9 Lincoln P. Bloomfield, In Search of American Foreign Policy:
The Humane Use of Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974),
p. 159 (italics removed).
2 0 Miriam Camps, The Management of Interdependence: A Pre-
liminary View (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1974), p. 157.
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Any kind of "evolution" in global patterns of interdependence
must by definition involve structural change. It is likely to be iden-
tified in terms both of enhanced subunit autonomy and more enduring
world order structures. Such structures, when defined in a multi-
level fashion and analyzed in terms of their coordinating rules, can
be classified (and will be below) into anarchies, quasi-regimes, and
regimes. As policy options, quasi-regime-building tends to be, but
is not always, more multilateral than the bilateral emphasis of
Chapter III, Volume I. But it may also be combined with selective
moves toward isolation and vulnerability reduction, as well as environ-
mental transformations.
3. Design Research on Interdependence Alternatives
A third feature of our proposed synthetic framework is
an emphasis on design research, the analysis of alternative, artificial
systems of global interdependence. The immediate point to emphasize
in the light of many different political programs being put forward for
achieving "world order, " "ecological balance, " "economic stability,"
"secure oil, " or "peace" is that any such order will be artificial, not
natural. It will not be sanctified by some evolutionary law of nature,
but will be the higher level product of human efforts vis-'a-vis the
historical - causal constraints of environmental context and the opera-
tional practices of normal official and unofficial cross-state relations.
It must start from the realities of the present, but like the present,
the future will be largely constructed.
For the "sciences of the artificial, " Herbert Simon sets the
following boundaries:
1. Artificial things are synthesized (although not always or
usually with full forethought) by man.
2. Artificial things may imitate appearance in natural things,
while lacking,in one or many respects, the reality of the latter.
3. Artificial things can be characterized in terms of functions,
goals, adaptations [and environmental transformations].
4. Artificial things are often discussed, particularly when they
are being designed, in terms of imperatives as well as descriptives. 21
2 1 H. A. Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial (Cambridge: M.I. T.
Press, 1969), pp. 5-6.
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Hence, world order-building is, at best, an "artificial science, "
requiring a design research orientation toward problems of generative/
regulative significance.
Note also how a design interest fits with the previous list of
analytical problems. Like many other piecemeal order-building
efforts, Prisoner's Dilemmas can be conceived of as objectively and
subjectively constrained design problems. They suggest the bankruptcy
of a strategy of pure independence. The problem is how can game
players and District Attorneys mutually design their game play and
their historical-causal contexts so as to avoid collectively irrational
outcomes? Dilemma res olutions occur through synthetic restructuring
of the actors, the current game situation, their game play, or its
action-outcome interaction possibilities. The objectives-constraint
problem is also characteristic of, and intrinsic to, any realistic
design interest governed bymuiltiple functions, goals, or adaptations.
Simon divides constraints into those that are part of a system's inner
environment (thus conceivable as domestic public goods to be maintained
or modified by political action) and those reflecting an external natural,
social, technological environment.
Designs by engineers or architects may be thought of as inter-
faces between these two environments. The often unanticipated con-
sequences of such artificial creations are the results of complex causal
interactions going through such interfaces in both directions. Designs
for human systems always face units of analysis problems, as they try
satisfactorily to coordinate and benefit a multiplicity of interconnected
actors, designers included, with multiple imperative concerns. For
example, in the Prisoner's Dilemma, which combination of prisoners
and district attorney does the reader identify with? Which should he
study? Realistic designs must also reconcile existing, hard-to-change
conditions and practices with restructuring concerns. Hence both
normal policy and systems strategy perspectives are appropriate.
A focus on interface problems brings us close to the need for
regime /quasi-regime /anarchy distinctions. To motivate this develop-
ment, consider how sequential Prisoner's Dilemmas or Chicken games
are resolved in those cases where natural, social, and technological
environments (other than communication possibilities) are largely non-
manipulable but their effects are somehow regularizeable.
Are not historically imagined principles or learned precedents
applied to game play in a more or less successful way? Should not
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collectivizing some aspects of the means of production be considered?
Is it not by the development of regulative rules and/or institutions for
coordinating expectations and behavior so that mutually satisfactory,
predictable, and, hence, stable outcomes occur in mixed interest,
interaction-contingent, collective outcome situations ?2 2 Whether or
not particular generative/regulative "rules" or "cues" or "under-
standings" develop making Chicken or Prisoner Dilemma games less
lethal depends on hard-to-predict consequences of game histories,
including sequences of reward and punishment outcomes. Possible
divergences and contradictions are likely between operational
coordinating rules, context-based ground rules or constraints, and
practices attempting formally to revise or regulate operational
behavior vis-'a-vis other actors and natural and social environmental
contexts. This multilevel distinction between ground rules, operating
rules, and generative/regulative norms should, therefore, be pre-
served. It suggests interesting dynamical analysis of quasi-regime
practices.
4. An Emphasis on Competing Cross-State Quasi-Regimes
Let us define quasi-regimes as multilevel rule systems
governing certain expectations and behaviors of two or more cross-
state actors with respect to each other and their natural and social
environments. A regime in the fuller sense of the term may be
characterized as a quasi-regime evidencing (a) mutuality or public-
ness of its benefits; (b) multilateral consensus on its rules among
major participants and directly affected transgovernmental actors;
(c) substantial stability, coherence, and effectiveness; and (d) the
institutionalization of its systemic- environmental relationships. Rule
systems satisfying only some of the above are, by default, quasi-
regimes. The Integrated Emergency Program of the Energy Coordina-
ting Group would be an example of a quasi-regime; its tentative,
untried nature vis-'a-vis points (c) and (d) clearly disallow the accurate
use of the "regime" level. Except when such differences between
regimes and quasi-regimes need emphasis, we shall often, however,
use the shorter phrase below.
22I have elaborated these points in my 1973 IPSA paper entitled
"Are There Voluntaristic Structural Models of Public Goods Generation?,"
a longer version of which will soon appear in Quality and Quantity. Being
suspicious of applying such simple analogies to international relations,
I only do so because of the pervasiveness of such arguments in the inter-
dependence literature.
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Nations desiring greater autonomy obviously resist regime candi-
dates constricting desired options and encourage those facilitating them.
World order structures not containing quasi-regimes might best formally
be described as anarchies in an unregulated, Hobbesian, or Rousseauian
sense. Note that without superordinate authoritative sanctioning systems,
even regimes in the full sense are not world governments. In the present
historical context, most piecemeal world order-building efforts
obviously will yield something a good deal less global, sanctioned,
legitimate, and effective than world government. They may have many
of the devolutional aspects noted by post-functionalists. Hence the
introduction of intermediate, but possibly transitional, quasi-regime
categories seems an appropriate emphasis within our methodological
synthesis.
"Detente, " "special relationships, " "operational codes, " "rights
to consultation, " "cooperative dependency relations between multi-
national corporations and certain government brueaucracies" are the
coin of much structure-sensitive contemporary interdependence policies.
It is my hope and intent to consider such relationships as quasi-regime
candidates, whose multilevel rule structures often need further articu-
lation and analysis. When successful, they usually breed efforts for
their fuller implementation and institutional obligations.
Why talk about competitive cross-state regime alternatives? Our
sixth common analytical problem requires it. Both the energy case
study and many features of our interdependence controversies point
toward the study of subgovernmental, supranational, and transnational
influences on regime development. In addition to research paradigm
cleavages, these can lead to cross-functional conflicts within govern-
ments and international organizations, and between power centers in
a multipolar world. Oil, coal, and atomic energy system alternatives
are obviously differentially attractive to such actors. As more or less
fully realized artifacts, regimes also create value-doctrine tensions
vis-'a-vis other regime "models" or status quo positions. Like inte-
gration and security theories, energy politics is full of competing
visions of how some kind of stable system might emerge. Pro-
competition market liberals, oil companies, institutional liberalism
OPECs, pro-integrationists, socialists, Moslem fundamentalists,
pragmatic pluralists, and Cold Warriors of either side of the East-West
conflict have contending visions of what kinds of world order should
emerge in the area. It is toward the analysis of such competing visions
of evolving interdependence that the present methodological framework
has been developed.
I
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGIES, MAXIMS, AND TECHNIQUES
by
Hayward R. Alker, Jr.
The present chapter will develop a number of methodological
maxims for appraising various techniques of possible relevance to the
analysis of evolving patterns of global interdependence. Once they
have been put in their appropriate methodological context, a variety
of social science techniques currently being used in international rela-
tions research will be critically reviewed in those terms. Anticipating
the results of this review, it is reasonable to expect that the demanding
questions raised by the structure-sensitive perspective of the previous
chapter will not easily and wholly succumb to existing analytic
techniques. Nor should we expect techniques to be more than pieces
of more comprehensive methodologies associated with old or new
analytical orientations to interdependence research. The more diffi-
cult and creative task of methodological innovation will be addressed
in Chapter IV.
A. Methodological Maxims for Interdependence Research
Anyone familiar with the development of analytical techniques
knows both that they have their origins in methodological orientations
associated with particular clusters of analytical concerns and that their
utility as intellectual products can be extended beyond their originating
contexts if appropriate adaptations are possible. 1 Thus both the review
lPublic goods analysis, for example, derives from institutional
liberalism, partly in response to Samuelson's proof that market equi-
librium is inefficient for goods with consumption externalities. It has
carefully been extended to the security field by Harrison Wagner, and
to regional integration studies by Ruggie and others. And input-output
analysis comes from Soviet Russia, but has been adapted to a liberal
context by Leontieff, and is now being applied by him to North-South
development -ecology tradeoff analysis.
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of existing analytical techniques for their applicability to new problems,
and the development of newer, more relevant techniques need careful
attention to the special features, including methodological require-
ments, of the newer context.
As a definition of such a new context, I have taken the common
analytical problems of the previous chapter, derived from attempts
to answer questions raised in the interdependence controversies of
Chapter II, Volume I, and the related issues of Volume II. A further
specification of analytical orientation was advanced. In the previous
chapter, I argued the relevance to interdependence issues of a histori-
cal systems approach to questions of world order design, emphasizing
competing cross-state quasi-regime alternatives. 2
Methodology is normative research philosophy: how one ought to
study something. 3 Methodologies are grounded in historically develop-
ing research communities, clusters of analytical concern, paradigm
complexes, or what Kuhn now prefers to call disciplinary matrices. 4
Methodological injunctions consist typically of positive and negative
working heuristics for knowledge construction. Therefore an attractive
way of articulating and concretizing the orientational emphasis of the
previous chapter is to restate it in terms of methodological maxims--
heuristic injunctions relevant to interdependence research.
2 Methodologically, I often find myself in agreement with Davis
Bobrow's constructive critique of the World Order Models Project
headed by Saul Mendlovitz. See Bobrow's "Transitions to Preferred
World Futures: Some Design Considerations, " 1974, unpublished. A
somewhat similar alternative is William D. Coplin and Michael O'Leary,
"A Policy Analysis Framework for Research, Education, and Policy-
Making in International Relations, " unpublished. Certain similarities
with the Keohane-Nye post-functionalist orientation, as described in
Volume I, should also be acknowledged.
3 Except for his anti-social-science bias, I find Lakatos' late
Popperian critical realism impressive on this and many related philo-
sophical questions. See his "Falsification and the Methodology of
Scientific Research Programmes, " in Criticism and the Growth of
Knowledge, ed. Imre Lakatos and A. Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970), pp. 91-195.
4 See Thomas Kuhn's introductory paper in Criticism and the
Growth of Knowledge, ed. Lakatos and Musgrave.
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We shall present twenty such maxims without claiming them to be
exhaustive of, or exclusive to, the present methodological orientation.
Since most of them are focused on what interdependence research
should look at, their application to particular techniques will help
determine relevance or nonrelevance more than adequacy or inadequacy.
Adequacy judgments involve many more standards of normative appeal,
judiciousness, contextual accuracy, goodness of fit or feasibility than
one could hope to cover in a few pages. Nonetheless, the maxims have,
as a whole, a fairly distinctive flavor to them, and should provide new
insights at later stages of critical and constructive interdependence
analysis.
Consistent with our choice of a world order design focus on inter-
dependence issues, these maxims can be described as design research
methodology. Herbert Simon suggests six topics comprising design
research on artificial systems. 5 They include, but go beyond, topics
usually considered by "realists" who think of balance of power systems
as somehow inevitable or "natural." Thus besides natural/social sci-
entific theories of external environments, Simon includes within design
research theories of internal environments, their objectives, motives,
and internal constraints. And to the normal concern with policy alterna-
tives he adds theories of alternative, artificial structures and their
relative performance as interfaces between inner and outer environ-
ments. Finally, with the high degree of linguistic self-consciousness
characteristic of modern methodologists, Simon goes beyond the nor-
mal concern with evaluating interface relations to study more abstract
questions concerned with the representation of design problems and
the choice of formal logics for description, design, and evaluation.
As should become clear, these topics can quite easily be adapted
to the present concern with global interdependence. For completeness
I suggest here a revised politicized version of this entire list, but
present specific analytical maxims for only the four topics that are the
most concrete.
5 Herbert Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial (Cambridge: M. I. T.
Press, 1969), p. 79f. and in the last chapter, entitled "The Architecture
of Complexity."
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Topic 1 The Representation of Interdependence Design Problems
Solutions to some problems are made easier and descrip-
tions more forceful by changing the ways in which the problem is con-
ceptualized. The emphasis on cross-state, quasi-regimes as core
parts of interdependence systems assumes, in fact, a representation
of policy flows and other transactions in and out of cross-state actors
through regime-like interfaces.
Looking at Figure 1 suggests one such clue to the analytical
problems of Chapter I. It suggests an important feature of both quasi-
regimes and cross -state actors, their openness as systems. Open
systems have determinative inputs from their environments. Such
inputs combine with control attempts to generate the negative and posi-
tive feedbacks generating many of the unanticipated consequences noted
by interdependence analysis. Making projections or predictions about
open systems requires knowledge of their resource and information
inputs, as well as other exchanges with their environments.
Figure 1 is also suggestive in policy terms. The most power-
ful reasons for structure-sensitive interdependence policy is not the
utopian faith of unrealistic international lawyers but the temptation of
nominally sovereign states to increase their predictive powers and
independent self-control through unilaterally regulated (or vetoable)
exchanges with external actors and natural environments. Thus the
politically attractive but often unfeasible goal of closing an open system,
redefined to include a cross-state actor and its associated regime
interfaces, could be schematized in the figure by extending unilaterally
controlled regime interfaces to regulate all inputs. Contending regime
alternatives often represent just such designs by major cross -state
actors.
Representational issues go beyond the question of how to schema-
tize quasi-regimes in the economic, ecological and security areas.
Useful, value-relevant conceptions of initial theoretical terms depend
in part on ontological predilections, scholarly interests and practical
utility. The interdependence analyst needs more and better ways of
simultaneously considering and comparing multiple objectives subject
to multiple constraints. One way of doing this is to develop formalisms
simultaneously representing equity, coercion, and efficiency objectives.
Consider, for example, Marx's respecification of Ricardian economics
to include exploitation and equity concerns through the introduction of
the concept of surplus labor value. Thurow's treatment of inequality as
a Samuelsonian public good similarly suggests how distributional
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questions can be treated within liberal political economy. 6
The deeper nature of rationality, freedom, and autonomy has been
explored in Deutschian cybernetics and Habermas' Marxian writings on
communicative competence. They may make possible respecifications
of mixed interest choice situations in ways facilitating resolutions of
Prisoner's Dilemmas. 7 Schelling's respecification of adversarial
military relationships as sequential, mixed interest, tacitly coordinated
two party games has already had some effects in political practice. 8
Conceptual typologies of regulative principles, policy possibilities, and
problem situations belong also in this topic. Such typologies will not be
further pursued here, other than to note how Figure 1 highlights a
variety of previously mentioned structure -sensitive policy options,
including self, practice, regime, other and natural environmental
transformations.
6 Lester Thurow, "The Income Distribution as a Pure Public Good,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 85, no. 2 (May 1971), pp. 327-36.
The classic reference is Paul Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public
Expenditure," Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 36, no. 4 (Novem-
ber 1954), pp. 387-89. A key maxim of liberal theory is restricted
but not totally denied by Thurow's approach: model choice processes
in ways that are essentially voluntaristic, with ordinal measurement,
not making interpersonal comparisons. The Marxian objection to these
maxims strikes me as more realistic.
7 Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political
Communication and Control (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe,
1963); and Jilrgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1970). Relevant research on Prisoner's Dilemmas is
being carried on by Walter Buckley, Tom Burns, and others.
8 Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1960).
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natural, social environments
Cross- state actors and quasi-regimes are open systemsFigure 1.
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Topic 2 Theories of Natural and Social Environments
Maxim 1 Theoretical specifications (and hopefully models) should
be made of the dynamics and transformability of natural
and social environments external to contemplated regime
participants.
The necess.ity of explicit external environment models
follows immediately from the .recognition that operating interdepend-
ence regimes, such as U. S. -U.S. S. R. crisis management, the Euro-
dollar market, or off-shore fishing conventions are open systems.
They are far from being powerful enough to close off the United States
from external dependencies. Hence, independence (in a strong sense
of completely autonomous self-control) is impossible, and future pro-
jections must go beyond those of the ceteris paribus sort which ignore
environmental inputs. Simon makes this point by saying design con-
straints cannot be ignored. By these we mean here (nonmanipulable)
theoretical principles governing the behavior of external environments,
such as the autonomous actions of other cross -state actors, some
macro-economic processes, and politically insulated. demographic or
ecological processes.
Even though the Forrester -Meadows models have many debatable
assumptions, particularly concerning the nonmanipulable nature of
linear technological adaptation to exponential growth, they must be
singled out methodologically as highly relevant modelling efforts within
the purview of the "natural" parts of this maxim. Seabed regulation
discussions based on different treatments of differently migrating and
reproducing fish populations also suggest differently designed regime
possibilities.
Maxim 2 But because such environments are rarely accurately
predictable, a probabilistic error treatment, using
appropriately specified random variables, is desirable
concerning parts of the environment not deterministically
modelable.
Nonlinear processes respond differently to random inputs
than linear processes; random inputs in the former case cannot be
averaged out or ignored. This maxim is more technical than the first.
It is grounded in a historical systems philosophy which does not see all
social and natural processes as completely deterministic. Nuclear
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on which occasions. 12
Regarding environmental impacts, research by Choucri and North
using econometric methods is a significant improvement, even if the
particulars of the alignment process are not explained. 13 They pre-
sent explanations of armaments, territorial expansion and violence
using, inter alia, environmental demographic, resource, and indus -
trialization variables. Projections. based on systems of probabilistically
determinative equations, including internal bureaucratic pressures and
external threats, often explain more than half of the variance in the
aforementioned political variables. During the important system change
associated with the end of the Bismarck era (c. 1892-1896), some, but
not all, of the key causal relationships remained stable.
Maxim 4 Attention should be given to the potential often-unanticipated
impacts or side effects of quasi-regime alternatives on
natural environments and on social groups whose support
is not necessary in the short run to sustain the inner struc-
ture of quasi-regime practices.
1 2 These self-critical assessments are based on research methods
that I have used. See Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Donald Puchala,
"Trends in Atlantic Partnership, 1928-1963," in Quantitative Interna-
tional Politics, ed. J. David Singer (New York: Free Press, 1968), and
Hayward R. Alker, Jr. , "Supranationalism in the United Nations,"
reprinted in International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in
Research and Theory, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free
Press, 1969).
1 3 Nazli Choucri and Robert North, Nations in Conflict (San
Francisco: W. H. Freeman, in press). Although not yet accomplished,
it is worth noting that Mesarovic-Pestel world model design goes be-
yond both the World Dynamics andLeontieff's efforts in meeting both
parts of the injunctional Maxim 4. See Mihajlo Mesarovic and Edward
Pestel, "A Goal-Seeking and Regionalized Model for Analyses of Criti-
cal World Relationships: The Conceptual Foundation, " Kybernetes,
vol. 1 (1972), pp. 79-85; and Barry Hughes, "Current Status of the
Mesarovic-Pestel World Model Project," (Cleveland: Systems Research
Center, Case Western Reserve University, 1974, unpublished).
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Ecological impacts are value related and thus included here.
Leontieff's extension of input-output analyses to a North-South case
with environmental impacts and costs deserves mention here. 14
This maxim also embodies the potentially valid insight of Marxist,
radical-liberal, neo-functionalist, and conservative theoretical tradi-
tions that cross -state regimes depend for their sustenance on, and
reward the support of, important transnational social groups. Not to
obtain relevant data to test for these effects in pa-rticular cases is both
bad regime planning and poor theory development.
Although transaction flow analyses do suggest nonrandom trends
associated with Common Market arrangements, more sophisticated
combinations of statistical techniques are necessary before such con-
centrations can be causally attributed to regime effect. 15 In a similar
fashion, it is hard without good causal theory to estimate effects of arms
control agreements on what might have happened.
Maxim 5 distills a major point easily derivable from either the
debate over Limits to Growth or the new political economy controversy,
if not from common bureaucratic sense or methodological sophistica-
tion: don't trust expert findings concerning natural or social regime
environments. Neither does it counsel despair; rather it concretizes
our earlier emphasis on analyzing competing regime alternatives.
Maxim 5 The findings of scientific experts with different doctrinal/
value emphases must be examined, checked, and compared
at least to the extent likely regime participants differ in
their environmental assessments.
14 Wassily Leontieff, Nobel lecture, Stockholm, 1973. The lecture
reflects a larger, UN-based project.
1 5 Important steps in this direction have been taken by Krause
and Linnemann, among others. See Lawrence Krause, European
Economic Integration and the United States (Washington, D. C. : The
Brookings Institution, 1968); and Hans Linnemann, An Econometric
Study of Internationl Trade Flows (Amsterdam: North Holland Pub-
lishing Company, 1966).
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One technique is rarely sufficient for this purpose: different
scholarly orientations often differentially stress different methods of
empirical assessment. Modified Delphi methods, were they extendible
to issues on which scholars with different paradigmatic orientations
did not converge in their prognostications, would help in this regard.16
But entirely independent studies by groups known to have different
orientations are often worth encouraging.
Topic 3 Theoretical Analyses of Interdependence Practices
(Including Internal Environments and Regime Capabilities)
Maxim 6
Maxim 7
Maxim 8
Actor -relevant time-specific actions, sensitivity effects,
resource costs, outcome trade-offs, and policy opportunity-
costs should be routinely part of analyses of interdepend-
ence practices.
Pblicy analyses should, moreover, be structure sensitive,
making explicit estimates of the relevant impacts of
external environments, internal organizational constraints,
policies, and cross-state quasi-regimes.
The appropriate multiplicity of cross-state actors should
be studied.
1 6 Delphi methods rely on repeated panels of expert judgments
or forecasts to build a kind of technocratic consensus. For a recent
application, see Fred Roberts' contribution in The Structure of Deci-
sion, ed. Robert Axelrod (forthcoming); and the extensive RAND litera-
ture. Summarizing a critical review, done with "Models, Simu-
lations, Games (MSGs)," Garry Brewer notes that over two-thirds of
such activity is all-machine technical or force structure analysis.
Half of 132 MSGs had not been subjected to external review, 35% could
not easily be transferred and replicated elsewhere, most professionals
felt competent reviews would be "harmful. " "Summary Report of a
Survey of Models, Simulations, and Games," P-5177 (Santa Monica:
Rand Corporation, 1974), especially p. 12.
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Just as historically grounded theories of external environments
help us think about possible regime developments or impacts, so formal,
empirical theories of interface practices allow us to assess the rela-
tive impacts of regularized relationships and the far more pervasive
unregulated policy actions of Figure 1. Maxim 7 goes beyond Maxim
6 and spells out the multiple levels of causation tentatively identified
as common concerns in interdependence controversies, energy politics,
and cross-state systems thinking. These maxims are responsive to
the growing complexities facing the interdependence analyst. The
relatively objective categories of Maxim 6 will be further supplemented
by the subjective ones in Maxim 9 below.
At this point it is worth emphasizing how much of empirical
research on international relations is centered on measuring inter-
action patterns without adding sensitivity effects, subjective data, cost
or trade-off information (all often hard to obtain). If empirical re-
search techniques--particularly events data analyses by McClelland,
Rummel, Burgess Azar, and others 1 7 -- are weak on these extra dimen-
sions, how much stronger can policy analysis be at making the difficult
causal assessments implied by Maxim 7? Public descriptions of PARA,
for example, do not sort out relative impacts in self-conscious manner.
1 8
17 Recent relevant summaries and critiques are: Edward Azar,
Richard Brody, and Charles McClelland, International Events Inter -
action Analysis: Some Research Considerations (Beverly Hills: A Sage
Professional Paper, 1972), vol. 1. 02-001; and Philip Burgess and
Raymond Lawton, Indicators of International Behavior: An Assessment
of Events Data Research (Beverly Hills: A Sage Professional Paper,
1972), vol. 1. 02-010. One particularly good piece of work of direct
relevance here, going beyond the limitations of particular coding tech-
niques, is Azar's "Analyses of International Events," Peace Research
Reviews 4 (November 1970), which links events data to the rise and
fall of Egyptian-Syrian integration. The CREON studies currently in
progress at Ohio State also show considerable structure-sensitivity in
their research design, but have not yet been fully reported.
1 8 PARA: Process, Problems and Potential (Ann Arbor: Social
Science Department, Bendix Aerospace Systems Division, July 1972),
chapter 2.
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Of course, complex, multilevel statistical models are necessary
for simultaneously assessing multiple effects. In this regard the
Choucri-North analysis of the 1870-1914 period and the Mesarovic-
Pestel World Model are quite unusual. The Choucri-North model allows
quantitative: assessments of alliance impacts, policy actions, domes-
tic bureaucratic inertia, environmental pressures, and (as residuals
or breakpoints) the effects of Bismarck-type system strategies. 19 The
fact that ten years' work went into collecting relevant attribute and
event data and developing the appropriate, still tentative econometric
models for the Choucri-North book gives an idea of the work involved
in taking Maxim 7 seriously.
The Mesarovic-Pestel model also contains some particularly
impressive impact assessment possibilities, joined with a rather rich,
interactive policy analysis routine showing alternate effects, trade-
offs, and opportunity costs associated with different policy options.
Unanticipated consequences in environmental or security dependencies
do occur because of the cross- sector nature of model interdependencies.
Table 1 shows simulated decision-making by a regional group of
developed market countries. Note how forecasts and alternative policies
and more specific implementation strategies can all be explored for
their implications. Global and regional lack of aggregation are possible
and within each environment -linked norm structure, policy planners,
policy choosers, decision structures, and natural-social causal environ-
ments are separately represented, allowing multi-level impact studies.
Hughes, for example, has shown (assuming valid economic models,
which are in fact rather simplified at the present stage and only par-
tially tested econometrically) how perceived threats to energy supply
could affect,at the normative level,developed market investment figures
by $20 billion or more per year, with considerable unanticipated growth
reduction effects. As in Table 1, instrument-objective constraints
are also suggested by this example. Newer institutional tools are
obviously called for, as we1ll as new ways of defining a smaller number
of overarching objectives.
1 9 Choucri and North, Nations in Conflict, Part IV. Also impor-
tant is a statistical study by R. Codoni, B. Fritsch et al., World Trade
Flows, Integrational Structure and Conditional Forecasts, 2 vols.
(Ztirich: Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag, AG. , 1971). Contingent
forecasts by Fritsch project increasing North-South inequalities in
export earnings as LDC GNPs increase.
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Table 1 on reverse page.
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Table 1. An Illustration of Interactive Multilevel Policy
Analysis Using the Me sarovic -P estel Economic -
Energy Submodel*
Computer Model of Natural and Human Decision Maker as
Organizational (Including Planner /Forecaster/
Economic -Energy) Environments Policy Implementor
Step 1: Potential current problems
sought.
Step 2: Computer lists: import scarcity, resource scarcity cost.
Step 3: Additional information on
anticipated problems sought.
Step 4: Simulation projects energy production cost increases
and forecasts estimated impacts of different increases
in regional energy production, consumption, import
levels for 1 to 10 years.
Step 5: Relevant policy alternatives
sought.
Step 6: Computer lists: increased imports, increased pro-
duction from investment increases or shifts, mixed
import /investment policies.
Step 7: Investment shift judged
promising: explanation
sought.
Step 8: Without total investment increase, shifts from
industry or service sectors (via oil depletion or
other tax benefits) are mentioned.
Steps 9 - 11: Another policy explored,
non-import-increasing invest-
ment shift tentatively chosen.
Step 12: Computer notes that shift from industry and services
slows down economic growth, which in turn relaxes
demand for energy.
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Table 1 (continued)
Step 13: Shift option chosen.
Steps 14 - 17:
Steps 18 - 20:
Different percent shift from industry, with
different trade effects explored, 30% cut in
industrial investment chosen.
Impact of $20. 5 billion shift is calculated on
1 to 10 year projections of consumption, pro-
duction, and trade balances and displayed.
*Derived from M. Mesarovic, E. Pestel, B. Hughes, et al.,
"An Interactive Decision Stratum for the Multilevel World Modelt"
(Hannover Technical University, 1973, unpublished). The analysis is
for the "region" of developed market economies.
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It will be recalled that Chapter II built up to the analysis of utility
interdependencies on the basis of earlier sensitivity interdependencies,
possibly evaluated in very different ways. The case for a regimes
emphasis within an order building focus depended heavily on increasing
recognitions of possibly securable mutual advantages, often of a public
sort, especially in the case where utilities were configured like those
of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Such a dilemma is the case par excellence
where independent interest-maximizing cross-state actors are self-
defeating. Important aspects of each controversy of Chapter II, Volume I,
fitted this analytical problem.
The next step in analyzing interdependence practices, then,
is the delineation of the preferences, perspectives, and utilities of
causally relevant cross-state actors in order to see which forms of
interdependent relationships might develop. The level of analysis
problem of interdependence controversies suggests a rich research
net if key determinative and regulative issues are not to be decided
by fiat. Both central governmental, loosely coordinated transgovern-
mental and transnational actors continually reappear in the literatures
we have reviewed, including the energy case.
Maxim 9 The subjective interests, preferences, identities, and
expectations of such actors should be researched, including
their assessments of alternative interface arrangements
(including various regime possibilities).
Bluntly put, how can we design cooperative economic strategies or
conservation regimes with communist states if we do not know their
appraisals of such relationships?
A cluster of new techniques has recently come into the inter-
national relations field directed toward the achievement of these difficult
objectives. It is a kind of third generation content analysis linked to
cognitive processing simulations. Axelrod, Bonham, Hart, and Shapiro
are the leading practitioners of a school that includes more established
scholars like Ole Holsti. and Alexander George at its fringes. 20.
2 0 Unfortunately, the two best summary volumes, The Structure of
Decision, ed. Robert Axelrod, and another volume edited by Mathew
Bonham and Michael Shapiro are not yet published. Many relevant papers
are available as preprints, however. And the next generation of cognitive
process models is already on the horizon. See Robert Abelson,"The Struc-
ture of Belief Systems," in Computer Models of Thought and Language, ed.
Roger Shank and Kenneth Coiby (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1974).
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These scholars have developed a fairly reliable (but probably less
valid) way of coding extensive interview material or documentary evid-
ence for qualitative causal maps of cognitive beliefs, including environ-
mental impacts and policy effect on decision-maker utilities. Bonham
and Shapiro, 21 for example, found a Middle East expert whose views
of the politics of the area were used to derive policy actions which
corresponded rather closely with subsequent United States govern-
ment actions in the area. The problem of obtaining relevant data on
key decision-makers here and abroad cannot be overlooked, however.
Nonetheless, Jeffrey Hart 2 2 and others have been able to use judgmental,
roll call, and public debate information to estimate diverging /converg -
ing alignments and perceived objective compatibilities associated with
different policies and regime alternatives in the oceans area.
At least a few words should be said how these qualitative cogni-
tive mapping approaches deal with instruments -objectives constraints
and unanticipated consequences problems. Because we would expect
law of the seas discussions to have many cross-sector issues and
trade-offs- -security, development, redistribution, and conservation
are obviously involved--we should expect incompatible objectives and
unanticipated side-effects to occur. They do, and can be represented
but are not always resolvable in cognitive maps. Simple policy dilem-
mas are sometimes resolved by finding other instruments without the
unanticipated negative side-effects. Coalition politics across regions
is, in Hart's case, a likely lubricant producing some cross-objective
compensations, but it is also likely to produce other unanticipated
complications in whatever oceans regime that actually develops. Until
cognitive mapping and related simulation approaches allow the reduction
of objectives a'nd the artificial creation of new policy instrumentalities --
such as Hammarskjold's end-run around British and French vetoes in
the Suez crisis -- they will not overcome these considerable problems.
2 1 Michael J. Shapiro and G. Matthew Bonham, "Cognitive Process
and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," International Studies Quarterly,
vol. 17, no. 2 (June 1973), pp. 147-74.
2 2 Hart's relevant paper is in the Axelrod volume. A more
explicit statistical study using public international organization roll
calls and speeches is Robert Friedheim and Joseph Kadane, "Ocean
Science and the UN Political Arena," Journal of Maritime Law and
Commerce, vol. 3, no. 3 (April 1972), pp. 473-502.
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Maxim 10 Judgments of actual (or hypothetical) system functions
should be supplemented, wherever appropriate, by
explicit theoretical statements of operational rule
structures and capability-loads analyses of them.
This maxim puts a hard test before the analyst of interdependence
practices. It spells out the multilevel regime emphasis of the previous
chapter designed to deal with mixed interest coordination problems. It
says to look first at actual (and, perhaps later, hypothetical) practices
to see if somehow they are systematically describable. Then, to the
extent possible. it suggests finding shared, more or less explicit, con-
sensual regulative system functions, ground rules, or operational rule
structures underlying or accounting for such regularities. But more is
necessary than exhibiting the structural bases of partial procedural or
substantive regime structures. Their capability for handling various
loads -- system crises, problems, or demands -- should then be assessed.
Why raise such questions? Because the piecemeal, disjointed
nature of much contemporary order-building practice is clearly related
to differing perceptions of the capabilities of various institutionalized
practices (or quasi-regimes) for handling various issues. Both Marxists
and integrationists stress the importance of crisis/demand overload for
the breakdown and transformation of various socio-economic and political
systems. The security of deterrence and the strength of crisis manage-
ment practices rest on assumptions about the adequacy of shared behavi-
oral codes, whose limited capabilities need continuous review according
to behavioral peace researchers. Market-oriented liberals and balance
of power realists both laud the adaptive, hidden hand capabilities of
their preferred systems; others criticize these systems as terribly
inadequate for achieving either welfare or security goals. Resolving
these substantive issues is part of the policy-maker's problems in
deciding which claims for reform-oriented interdependence policies or
systems strategies he should take seriously.
Just as William Riker has shown the logical inconsistency of one
reading of Kaplan's Balance of Power System Rules, 23 so less elegant
studies of collective security regimes have shown early pious expecta-
tions about UN capabilities in this area predictably to have been over-
2 3 William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).
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rated. 24 Barry Hughes' previously cited explorations of different norm
structures for developed market economies presage a similar kind of
regime analysis in the Mesarovic-Pestel economic-energy context.
Both actual and hypothetical alternatives were explored. Concerning
the future, the interdependence analyst needs to know which rules are
likely to be operative in what contexts, with what effects, before one
can knowledgeably support or condemn feasible alternative regimes.
An historical systems approach makes further demands. Until
the development of memory-rich artificial intelligence simulations,.
such as chess-playing programs, traditionalists were always potentially
right in asking behavioralists about the role- of history in the processes
being observed and modelled. Something more than statistical averag-
ing over one or two previous time periods was necessary, if innovative
rather than inertial bureaucratic processes were to be understood.
Most statistical analysis (including Choucri-North econometric models,
Forrester-Meadows models, and especially game-theoretic deterrence
models) summarize the past very parsimoniously, ignoring what both
lawyers and realists call precedents. Behavioral peace researchers
have usually preferred equally ahistorical statistical models of past
effects and have often succeeded scientifically by omitting a lot of
relevant contexts from their experimental set-ups. Hence Maxim 11
gores more than one ox:
Maxim 11 Memory-rich specifications of quasi-regimes are to be
preferred over ahistorical ones because the performance,
reproduction, and self-transformation of historical systems
depend importantly on memory processing capacities.
2 4 See Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and William Greenberg, "Analyzing
Collective Security Regime Alternative," to appear in the Bonham-
Shapiro volume. Capabilities in this case were assessed in terms of
batting averages or integrals taken over hypothetical conflict environ-
ments. A more powerful version of this methodology, going more
deeply into the modern cybernetics literature, is Hayward R. Alker, Jr.,
"Political Capabilities in a Schedule Sense: Measuring Power, Integra-
tion and Development" in Mathematical Approaches to Politics, ed.
Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Karl Deutsch, and Antoine Stoetzel (New York:
Elsevier, 1973).
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Of the analytical tools we have looked at, only the Alker-Green-
berg paper, CASCON, and parts of the cognitive maps literature have
moved much in this direction. Mesarovic-Pestel analysis also allows
the nonsimulated decision-maker to use his own memory as a problem
solver and even helps him ref-resh it, but does not go into CASCON-type
precedent "searches" in the design of the normative level of their
fully computerzied multilevel simulations.
This maxim has an elitist, high-technology pedigree: most
modellers cannot easily live up to such standards because they cannot
conceive or afford relevant list-processing simulations. But it does
help emphasize the importance of human role players--or memory
banks--in man-machine simulations or more traditional all-human
political military exercises. Innovative policy thinking, restructuring
given instruments and objectives to make hard choices, is very hard
to program on a computer. 25
Topic 4 Logics for Prescribing/Describing Interdependence Designs
Given the normative quality of regimes themselves, and
debates about preferred alternatives, an abstract subject with both
classical and contemporary relevance is the comparison of descriptive
and prescriptive logics. Practical politicians have always used
rhetoric, persuasion and propaganda to advantage. At a higher order
of methodological discussion is the utility of various rationality logics,
including variants of choice theory and cost/benefit analysis for making
political arguments. Marxian-liberal conceptual debates about labor
value theories belong here too.
Even more abstractly, Simon, other philosophers, and computer
semanticists are studying the necessary properties of alternative formal
language systems for articulating plans, deriving normative implica-
tions of general rules or standards, or articulating analogical reasoning
2 5 The most recent experimentation in professional-level all-
human political games (POLEX) at M. I. T. made explicit a number
of analytical features including the historical and processual models
supplied via use of experienced game participants. See Lincoln P.
Bloomfield and Cornelius J. Gearin, "Games Foreign Policy Experts
Play: The Political Exercise Comes of Age, " Orbis, vol. 16, no. 4
(Winter 1973), particularly p. 1028.
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so important to precedent-based policy inferences from historically
rich data sources. The need to mesh statistical evidence and judgmental
data in planning crisis -relevant information systems illustrates how
these concerns can have practical consequences. 26 But we shall not
follow them further here.
Topic 5 The Search for Successful Interdependence Policies
What are the cumulative "lessons" of American-Soviet
confrontations, as they have modified operating procedures and sub-
stantive agreements in subsequent crises--the core structure of the
"crisis management" quasi-regime on which we depend for our lives?
Why did Vietnam "disengagement" take so long? More immediately,
what were the old and new elements of the Israeli-Egyptian situation,
how were they combined, with what sequencing, why successful in
Secretary of State Kissinger's truce negotiation effort? Could other
feasible regimes have been previously conceived? Were they? What
mix of desirable objectives did they achieve in economic, communal,
ecological, and military terms? How did they mesh with routine policy
considerations? Were instrument -objective constraints somehow
overcome? Which of the many imaginative policy options mentioned
in Volume I should the United States pursue, in what order, on what
issues?
Simon argues that design solutions are action sequences leading
from present to possible worlds satisfying internal and external con-
straints. It is clear that regime-innovative statesmen must work in
similarly complex ways, even though the relevant considerations of
systems strategy are rarely made public with alacrity. Systematic
policy searching surely also involves imagining alternative regime
prospects and multiple objectives, including those currently or prev-
iously contending for cross-state support. Modest revisions of old
regime types often have strong appeal because of their greater
261 again have in mind here systems like the Bloomfield-Beattie
CASCON system, which interactively allows the experimentor to make
many of the judgments of likely effects of conflict resolution measures
in an emerging conflict situation, but which gives him a rich data base
of measures relevant to "similar" previous cases, including scholarly
postmortem judgments.
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familiarity, enabling actors to calculate likely outcomes using histori-
cal experience as precedents, yet some solutions require a great many
necessary conditions to become sufficiently effective. Figure 1
helped typologize the many relevant possibilities of reform.
Learning from order-building efforts, from historical deterrence/
compellance actions, or from political-military games how to institu-
tionalize and enhance relevant conflict resolution capabilities requires
the identification of successful staging heuristics., plus explicit post-
mortems on both time-specific successes and failures. 27 To the extent
that confidentiality allows, public criticism, as well as adversarial
scientific critiques, are necessary to ensure genuine evolution in such
regime-building practices. Such methods may differ in degrees of
formalization from the problem factorization techniques and means -ends
methodologies by Simon, but their ends are very similar. All of these
concerns and injunctions are responses to the increasing complexities
facing the interdependence analyst.
One can summarize these points more forcefully as follows.
Maxim 12
Maxim 13
Maxim 14
More than one interdependence design or "possible world"
should be considered (hopefully varying in terms of key
objectives and values summarized in Maxims 6 and 7.)
Otherwise system restructuring strategies are operationally
meaningless.
Historical practices, including precedents, should be used
for the (re)design of the multiple alternatives noted above.
Sequentially explicit construction heuristics (design princi-
ples) must be explicated; otherwise their operational mean-
ing remains obscure.
2 7 International relations research is rather behind in its use of
such techniques. Forrester students and Mesarovic-Pestel coworkers
have considered and used some of them. Bobrow's "Transitions to
Preferred World Futures" is especially good in discussion of Falk-
Mendlowitz "future" projections in these terms. See also Alker,
"Political Capabilities in a Schedule Sense.
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Maxim 15 Feasibility arguments about a regime alternative should
spell out and make plausible the attainability of necessary
and/or sufficient conditions for each order-building stage.
Maxim 16 Explicated regime construction or redesign principles
must be scientifically and prescriptively subject to post-
mortem analyses; otherwise statesmanship can never be
a cumulative science of design.
Topic 6 The Evaluation of Cross -State Interdependence
Simon emphasizes the relevance of conventional utility
theory techniques, optimal control algorithms and artificially intelli-
gent heuristics as ways of evaluating engineering designs. Political
architecture may be more difficult consensually and perceptively to
assess.
Surely one of the clearest messages of this report is the need to
look at structural (including regime) alternatives. From this follows
the need to evaluate current or hypothetical interdependence structures
in terms of the value differences at the heart of the issues we have
looked at. Maxim 17 summarizes our discussion of these, as follows.
Maxim 17 Interdependence relationships, including regimes and less
consensual structures, should, at a minimum, be analyzed
for the efficiency, equity, autonomy, capacity, moderniza-
tion, and conservation objectives meaningful to potential
participants in such relationships.
The centrality of such concerns at this point should require
no further argument. Vernon's 1972 analysis on this point suggests
such an awareness even if its prescriptions might not be attractive or
historically valid in the light of subsequent developments.
The oil-producing countries have come to be
the senior partners, in effect, in the world oil
oligopoly. To the extent that "order" exists in
the market, it is maintained mainly by the vertical
integration of the oil companies, supplemented by
the elaborate network of relationships between
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them, and shored up by the official United States
system of proration and import controls. To the
extent that benefits derive from such order, they
are shared by the producing countries; indeed,
by now, the lion's share of these benefits goes
to the producing countries.
. . . It may be that developing countries are
bound to feel a sense of vulnerability-to world
markets irrespective of their policies toward
multinational enterprises. . . . The issue,
therefore, may be to find an acceptable form of
dependence, one that is not more threatening than
necessary to the sense of control required on the
part of the national leadership. 28
Vernon's judgmental, historical, and incomplete statistical
studies of the effects of joint ventures on investment and growth point
toward other evaluative standards of relevance more broadly in inter-
dependence analyses, even if it ignores possibilities of revolutionary
transformations in domestic social structures.
Maxim 18 Moreover, political and economic evaluations should be
extended to include the opportunity costs for relevant
actors of regime alternatives, not just the opportunity
costs of normal policy alternatives mentioned inMaxim 6.
Maxim 19 As part of the scientific contribution to such discussions,
an appropriate mix of judgmental, rational, and complex
causal assessments should repeatedly be used in order to
ensure relatively comprehensive quasi-regime evaluations
in changing conditions of historical interdependence. '
2 8 Raymond Vernon, The Operations of Multinational United States
Enterprises in Developing Countries: Their Role in Trade and Develop-
ment (New York and Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, 1972), pp. 6 and 26. See also his impressively thorough
but often judgmental "Multinational Enterprises in Developing Countries:
An Analysis of National Goals and National Policies," draft prepared
for United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 1974.
2 9 This maxim is also in part responsive to work by William
Coplin, Michael O'Leary, and others, at Syracuse University, who argue
the increased relevance to foreign policy analysis of judgmental techniques.
For several reasons I agree, but would supplement such judgments as
indicated.
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The problem of really joining debate over his arguments comes
from a deeper aspect of the liberal-radical divide. Marxists are some -
times willing to accept his arguments about net capital outflows from
Latin America, the benefits to industrialized labor, and "efficient"
world GNP enhancement of such relationships and the decreasing
structural opportunity costs of nationalization in some cases. But
they object at a deeper level to the ways such evaluations are framed
and socialist alternatives ignored.
Emmanuel's equally eclectic and analytically fascinating study of
pre-1960 trading practices evaluates many of the same trends Vernon
observes,' in terms of the degree of coercive exploitation interest in
capitalistically organized transnational trade relationships between
industrially advanced and economically backward countries .30 The
increasing gap between developed and underdeveloped countries, and
between centers and peripheries in underdeveloped countries, an equity
issue largely ignored by Vernon, is highlighted.
Both positions might need re -evaluation, however, in the light
of certain structural transformations taking place in global resource
markets. Serious efforts such as those by Thurow and Ruggie to extend
public goods analyses to include systems evaluations and e uity issues
are also necessary for real communication on these points.3 1 Such
cross-paradigm communication is extraordinarily difficult, yet more
necessary with, across, and between nations that are increasingly, if
often still asymmetrically, interdependent. Hence:
Maxim 20 Public debate and cross -paradigm adversarial science are
necessary for the discovery of latent system functions
(such as inequity perpetuation) and the definition of quasi-
regime objectives susceptible to legitimate institutionalization.
3 0 Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism
of Trade (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972).
3 1 The reader will recall relevant discussions in my previous
chapters.
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B. A Provisional Review of Research Technique Relevance to Inter-
dependence Analysis
With apologies to Professor Brzezinski, Table 2 leads to a
relevance box score for the analytical techniques and orientations we
have so far discussed. Adequacy issues are not addressed. The judg-
ments given there have not been replicated by other methodologists; nor
are they intended to extend beyond the context defined in terms of ana-
lytical problems common to interdependence issues. The judgments are
ceteris paribus judgments, usually limited to particular uses of particu-
lar techniques, and within the limited research focus of their cited
authors, rather than reviews of a technique in and of itself. It is with
some reluctance that I apply all the maxims to each particular technical
use--a technique is not bad if it doesn't do everything at once. But a
provisional justification for doing so is the difficulty I have in knowing
when the questions and processes analyzed by other scholars can be
held in abeyance while the problems of a particular study are being
addressed.
Several conclusions emerge from the table summary.- First of
all, most techniques do not satisfy most maxims of relevance, let alone
the harder tests of adequacy one might want to impose. Behavioralists
should be cautioned, therefore, about rushing into interdependence
debates with poorly adapted tools. But the opposite conclusion limits
the traditionalists' skepticism concerning social science research
capabilities. There are techniques in existence that move toward
meeting almost any one of the maxims of relevance our analytical con-
text has suggested. And more recent approaches are sometimes more
comprehensive.
The real inconclusiveness of this finding, however, follows from
a third concluding observation. We do not have a good idea how well
we can put together the substantive conclusions derived from piece-
meal studies of multisectoral phenomena about which scholars from
many different disciplines are asking often difficult analytical questions.
Briefly, we don't know how factorable interdependence issues really
are. The single most impressive technique for simultaneously address-
ing the issues we have looked at, the Mesarovic-Pestel world model,
does, however, suggest a way of implementing a synthetic analytical
design, at least within the economy-energy area.
Again the conclusion also emerges: the present project is some -
what misnamed. Hence we call our report Analyzing Global.Interdepend-
ence rather than the overspecific yet indeterminate title "Techniques
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for Analyzing Global Interdependence. '' One can far better assess the
relevance to interdependence analysis of particular research programs
and associated multi -technique methodological orientations like the
Mesarovic -Pestel simulation-econometrics effort, or Kaplan's sys -
tems analyses. Other multi-technique analytical orientations are
Cooper's mode of institutional economics, Marxist political economy,
cognitive mapping research, and the Chourcri-North usage of econo-
metrics and events-data techniques. Techniques are content free and
theoretically applicable to almost any context tha-t acquiesces to their
imposition. It is the guiding research programs or methodological
orientations, such as the world order design interest or Forrester's
philosophy of systems dynamics that needs discussion, not per se the
techniques of alternate future scenarios or Dynamo simulation that are
most appropriate to assess.
The quality, relevance, and adequacy of a particular simulation
far outweighs the question of whether or not simulation per se should
be employed. The summary table is full of such ambiguities. Should
we castigate integration studies because RA analysis is weak? Vernon's
papers are obviously very relevant to dependency debates even though
one would be hard pressed to describe his mixed approach in terms of
one or two specific analytical techniques: liberal political economic
analyses seem the more appropriate methodological label. Is his use
of historical evidence a technique? Are not the values he talks about,
or avoids, as crucial to the choice of technique as the capabilities of
the technique per se ? Differences in research programs need to be
highlighted for choice purposes in this case.
We are thus led to suggest that policy-value -interest-linked
research programs and associated methodological research designs
are the appropriate units for discussions of how ought one to analyze
evolving patterns of global interdependence. The maxims of the present
chapter are in fact derived from a partially synthetic methodological
framework designed to catch as many of the key concerns and analytical
problems in the interdependence literature as possible: hence our
focus on a historical systems approach to world order design questions,
emphasizing competing cross-state quasi-regime alternatives. Chap-
ter IV will go further in suggesting how such a focus and its derivative
maxims apply to particular research areas, such as international
commodity flows.

CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
by
Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Nazli Choucri
This chapter will attempt to restate the principal conceptual and
methodological findings in the analyses of Volumes II and III and to
make recommendations in a way in which, action can be taken on them.
First, we present our conclusions regarding the analytical meanings
of the term "interdependence." In so doing we present some impor-
tant distinctions which, if regularly used, would greatly clarify the
semantic confusions ably highlighted in Chapter I, Volume I. Second,
we recapitulate the appropriate methodological maxims of Chapter III
as a basis for suggesting how future analyses of interdependence might
be undertaken. Such analyses represent the natural extension of the
exchange and transaction orientation of the energy interdependence
study of Volume II of this report. They could be applied to any issue
area involving actual or potential transactions among nations, to
strategic as well as nonstrategic minerals, and to science and techno-
logy transfers. Our discussion presupposes the previous chapters'
discussions of different types of cross-state actors and their quasi-
regime relationships, as well as their rationale for the methodological
maxims that we recommend be applied in future research on global
interdependence.
A. Six Analytical Meanings of Interdependence
One major conclusion from our empirical investigations in
Volume II and the methodological investigations of this volume pertains
to the notion of interdependence. We now have acquired a sound per-
spective on the meanings of the term, which can be used to identify
the extent to which two firms, governments (or other cross-state
actors) are, or are not, interdependent at any point in time. There
are, in effect six analytical meanings of interdependence. Each
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provides a different perspective and casts light on a different dimen-
sion of the phenomena of international relations, which we here con-
ceive of as actual and potential interactions (including transactions
and exchanges) among cross-state actors.
The first meaning of interdependence we have identified is that
of consumption interdependence. This is created when the products
of human activity flow across national boundaries in ways in which
their consumption by one cross-state actor does not wholly prevent
or exclude others from enjoying or suffering from them. In this case
economists refer to public or collective "goods"; we have extended
this idea to include as well those products of political actions which
exhibit consumption interdependence. This kind of interdependence
is often a by-product of the network of actual or potential interactions
constituting international relations.
Below the normal flow of such collective goods and private ones
are natural, social, and political structures engendering these flows
and differentially capable of terminating them or beginning new ones.
The second meaning of interdependence thus follows from the first
and concerns the causal relations and structures determining observed
or potential cross-states interactions, including resource flows.
Causal interdependencies are partially asymmetric relationships
normally studied by the various natural and social sciences; they
reflect cause-effect interconnections among flows, actions, and under-
lying structures. Although the purposes, intentions, and designs of
various actors have not been introduced before defining such inter-
dependencies, these objective, causal relations may involve the
subjective values, expectations, and preferences of cross-state actors.
They thus suggest yet another analytical meaning of interdependence.
The third meaning is that of cross-state sensitivities, which may
be of a symmetric or asymmetric sort and may involve an actor with
other actors and/or his natural and social environments. The degree
of sensitivity interdependence varies with the extent to which causal
independencies impact on events positively or negatively evaluated by
particular cross-state actors, particularly their political concerns.
Interdependence refers more generally and purposively to a
system of relationships or to policies designed to realize, change,
maintain, or prevent value outcomes in particular situations. Policies
or systems of interdependence can be distinguished from external
actors and their natural or social environments. We can characterize
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both international systems, their problematic situations, and the
actual or potential policy responses they provoke in terms of their
utility-interdependence. By this we mean the extent to which inter-
national actors attach the same stakes (or utilities) to certain goods,
policies, or outcomes, that is, the extent to which their cares are
conflicting or complementary. The greater the compatibilities in
their utilities (what they value and how much), the more positively
utility interdependent they are. Some degree of positive utility-
interdependence always characterizes the consumption of collective
goods (but not the consumption of collective bads or shared products
with mixed evaluations). For this reason, it is important to identify
ways of reordering international relations to increase access by all
nations to genuine collective goods.
Against the level of systemic interdependence, a fifth analytical
meaning is that of cross-sectoral interdependence. This refers to the
often unconscious dependence of one actor's designs, plans, and
actions upon those of other actors in other natural, economic, social,
or political sectors. Cross-sectoral interdependencies inevitably
also involve the causal interdependencids within or across such sectors.
The policy implication here is that successful task performance involves
the deep understanding and regime-coordinated mastery of such cross-
sectoral, systemic interdependencies. Thus, for example, the job
descriptions of organized divisions of labor can be described even
more fully in terms of the often unconscious functions performed by
various actors or their subunits in the realization or frustration of
overall objectives. So, too, the successful production of many collec-
tive goods (including the regulation of public bads) often requires
increasingly complex regulative relationships.
Sixth, and finally, there is vulnerability interdependence. This
refers to the asymmetrical abilities of cross-state actors to trans-
form their sensitivity, utility, and cross-sectoral interdependencies.
An actor is highly vulnerable if it costs him more than he can afford
to obtain certain systemic transformations or to prevent certain out-
comes. There is an objective calculation at the basis of any attempt
of one actor to change the asymmetrical relation. There are also
subjective dimensions to this vulnerability. Opportunity costs and
resource costs must both be taken into account.
Each of these six dimensions of interdependence has been given
a preliminary treatment in the early chapters of this volume. In sum,
they suggest that international interdependence refers to consumption
-60-
externalities generated by actual or potential interactions and flows,
themselves the product of causal relations and structures evoking'as
well value sensitivities, where utilities are sometimes interdependent,
where there are often unappreciated cross-sectoral dependencies, and
where each cross-state actor is unequally vulnerable to such relation-
ships. These six dimensions together serve to characterize a situa-
tion of interdependence.
It is worth noting the compatibility of these distinctions with the
principal definition of Chapter I of Volume I: ". . . interdependence
refers to a situation of two-way dependence between states or enter-
prises possessing things of value to others and thus able to indulge
or threaten each other with those benefits. " This definition highlights
a situation of bilateral sensitivity dependence, distinguished by
possessive control relations over largely private goods exercised by
two very important cross-state actors, national governments, and
economic enterprises. The six interpretations of interdependence
which we present here as our analytical conclusion to this study
encompass the definition of Chapter I in Volume I, but go beyond it
to highlight the multidimensional and multifaceted nature of the phenome-
non of interdependence. Our perspective takes into account both public
and private goods, governmental and nongovernmental actors, sub-
jective and objective factors, the asymmetries and symmetries involved,
and the costs and vulnerabilities to each actor. Interdependence is
thus a complex multidimensional phenomenon. To characterize it as
a simple two-way relationship of dependence is incomplete, if not
misleading. There are additional important characteristics of this
two-way dependence that make it a situation of interdependence, if
and when such is the case.
B. Implications for the Analysis of Energy Interdependence
Our analysis of global energy problems in Volume II reinforces
the conclusion that world energy transactions and the flow of energy
across national borders have given rise to a situation of genuine,
partly global interdependence. The basis of today's energy system is
petroleum, and the production, consumption, imports, and exports of
petroleum have shaped the parameters of the world energy system,
structuring a network of mutual sensitivities and vulnerabilities that
meet all six meanings of "interdependence.
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Thus:
1. Consumption Externalities Generated by Flows of Goods
and Services
Transactions between producers and consumers of petroleum have
been structured in terms of flows of petroleum in return for petroleum
revenues. Although pure market exchanges of export goods for cash
do not require reciprocal import relationships, such have usually
occurred, differentially binding both the producers and the consumers
in a well-defined situation of exchange with some degree of mutual
gain. The "collectiveness" of such relationships is, however, rather
parochial, far less universal than a global public good.
2. Causal Relations Determining Actual or Potential Flows
of Goods and Services Across National Boundaries
It is the petroleum needs of the advanced societies that have pro-
moted the exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources in the
producing countries. This need is generated by the requirements of
industrialization and the maintenance of industrial output. Indeed,
access to energy is a vital factor in the production process. In con-
junction with technologies of development, we would argue that the
preferences and priorities of both producers and consumers have
causally structured the basic flows of petroleum. Thus, some con-
sumers have opted for a policy of simply assuring access to petroleum;
others have followed a strategy of diversification, reducing reliance
upon any one single source; and still others have opted for a strategy
of concentration, focusing primarily on one trading partner, to the
exclusion of others. The need for petroleum resources, and the values
and preferences of the trading partners, together, constitute much of
the causal mechanisms generating the flows of petroleum across
national boundaries.
3. Cross-State Sensitivity
The network of petroleum flows has produced marked cross-
state sensitivities, in that the policies of producers invariably affect
the consumers' interests much as the actions of the consumers also
influence the producers. In the first case, the similarity is direct,
in that any attempt by the producers to change the structure of the
network will immediately influence the consumers; in the second case
the influence also occurs, but, in all likelihood, with a certain delay.
This mutually directed influence is inevitably reflected in cross-state
s ens itivitie s.
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4. Shared Utilities
The mutual sensitivities of producers and consumers are predi-
cated upon common utilities and a high degree of positive utility co-
variance. Each party has distinct stakes attached to the transaction.
Thus, the consumers rely heavily upon petroleum resources because
modern economies cannot survivie without access to petroleum. Pro-
ducer nations are almost exclusively dependent upon their petroleum
receipts for government revenues and for national income. In each
case, this dependence upon the other is near total; and in each case
the stakes each attaches to the transaction are extremely high. The
gains of one party are almost always accompanied by gains to the
other. Nonproducing underdeveloped countries, however, do not
directly share in such relationships.
5. Cross-Sectoral Interdependence
The dual networks of petroleum and revenue flows have generated
complex cross-sectoral interdependencies which are most clearly
illustrated by the balance of payments issue. The transfer of funds
across national borders affects the national accounts of all parties,
with attendant implications of an economic, political, strategic, and
communal nature. Thus, the cross-state interdependencies, whereby
mutual sensitivities along one issue or policy sector (such as the
economic) lead to mutual sensitivities in another (most notably the
political or strategic). The economic consequences of petroleum flows
have given rise to complex cross-sectoral dependencies, the full impli-
cations of which are not yet completely understood.
6. Vulnerability Interdependence in Terms of the Asymmetrical
Ability of One State to Reshape Its Interrelationships
The consumer countries are obviously vulnerable to price increases
or to production limitations. The ability of the producers to have an
impact upon the consumers is enormous. Similarly, the consumer
countries could freeze the foreign assets of the producers, withhold
the transfer of funds, and so forth. Thus, the impact can go the other
way as well. The actual implications of vulnerability interdependence
are predicated upon the utilities involved, the cross-state sensitivities,
the structure of the network of flows, the underlying causal relations,
and the resulting cross-sectoral interdependencies.
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TABLE 3. Methodological Maxims for Interdependence Research
A. Theories of Natural and Social Environments
Maxim 1
Maxim 2,
Maxim 3
Maxim 4
Maxim 5
B. Theoretical Analyses of Interdependence- Practices
(Including Internal Environments and Regime Capabilities)
Maxim 6
Maxim 7
Maxim 8
Maxim 9
Maxim 10
Actor-relevant time-specific actions, sensitivity effects, re-
source costs, outcome trade-offs, and policy opportunity-costs
should be routinely part of analyses of interdependence practices.
Policy analyses should, moreover, be structure sensitive, making
explicit estimates of the relevant impacts of external environments,
internal organization constraints, policies, and cross-state
quasi-regimes.
The appropriate multiplicity of cross-state actors should be studied.
The subjective interests, preferences, identities, and expecta-
tions of such actors should be researched, including their
assessments of alternative interface arrangements (including
various regime possibilities).
Judgments of actual (or hypothetical) system functions should
be supplemented, wherever appropriate, by explicit theoretical
statements of operational rule structures and capability-loads
analyses of them.
Theoretical specifications (and hopefully models) should be
made of the dynamics and transformability of natural and social
environments external to contemplated regime participants.
But because such environments are rarely accurately prec-
dictable, a probabilistic error treatment, using appropriately
specified random variables, is desirable concerning parts of
the environment not deterministically modelable.
Ascertain actual and potential information and resource flows,
including causal impacts from environments into major actors
and actual or potential regimes.
Attention should be given to the potential often-unanticipated
impacts or side effects of quasi-regime alternatives on natural
environments and on social groups whose support is not neces-
sary in the short run to sustain the inner structure of quasi-
regime practices.
The findings of scientific experts with different doctrinal/
value emphases must be examined, checked, and compared at
least to the extent likely regime participants differ in their
environmental assessments.
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Maxim 11 Memory-rich specifications of quasi-regimes are to be preferred
over ahistorical ones because the performance, reproduction, and
self-transformation of historical systems depend importantly on
memory processing capacities.
C. The Search for Successful Interdependence Policies
Maxim 12
Maxim 13
Maxim 14
Maxim 15
Maxim 16
More than one interdependence design or "possible world" should
be considered (hopefully varying in terms of key objectives and
values summarized in Maxims 6 and 7). Otherwise system restruc-
turing strategies are operationally meaningless.
Historical practices, including precedents, should be used for the
(re)design of the multiple alternatives noted above.
Sequentially explicit construction heuristics (design principles) must
be explicated; otherwise their operational meaning remains obscure.
Feasibility arguments about a regime alternative should spell out
and make plausible the attainability of necessary and/or sufficient
conditions for each order-building stage.
Explicated regime construction or redesign principles must be
scientifically and prescriptively subject to post-morten analyses;
otherwise statesmanship can never be a cumulative science of design.
D. The Evaluation of Cross-State Interdependence
Maxim 17'
Maxim 18
Maxim 19
Maxim 20
Interdependence relationships, including regimes and less consen-
sual structures, should, at a minimum, be analyzed for the effici-
ency, equity, autonomy, capacity, modernization, and conservation
objectives meaningful to potential participants in such relationships.
Moreover, political and economic evaluations should be extended to
include the opportunity costs for relevant actors of regime alterna-
tives, not just the opportunity costs of normal policy alternatives
mentioned in Maxim 6.
As part of the scientific contribution to such discussion, an appro-
priate mix of judgmental, rational, and complex causal assess-
ments should repeatedly be used in order to ensure relatively com-
prehensive quasi-regime evaluations in changing conditions of
historical interdependence.
Public debate and cross-paradigm adversarial science are necessary
for the discovery of latent system functions (such as inequity per-
petuation) and the definition of quasi-regime objectives susceptible
to legitimate institutionalization.
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C. Applications of Maxims to the Analysis of Energy Interdependence
Table 3 presents the methodological maxims developed in earlier
chapters of Volume III. As a way of illustrating their research impli-
cations, the following discussion conceretely applies them to the
analysis of energy interdependence. Some of these have already been
followed in the research of Volume II. Others require further
investigation.
Maxim 1
Maxim 2
Maxim 3
Theoretical specifications should be made of the structure
of the world energy system in terms of the natural and
social environments which shape its parameters. Produc-
tion, consumption, and reserves of energy within national
borders need to be delineated as well as changes in such
patterns over time.
In seeking to model the dynamics and change in the natural
environment of the world energy system (that environment
which shapes its parameters), it is desirable to incorporate
those aspects of the system whose structure and behavior
are not well specified in terms of probabilistic error
systems.
Delineate empirically the flows of energy across national
boundaries as well as the flows of information and technol-
ogy designed to condition these flows. Such delineation
will then allow the next step, namely, determining the
causal relations that shape the flows and that provide the
initial information input into actual or potential energy
regimes.
Following from the above, the next step would be to examine
the unanticipated consequences of emerging patterns of
energy flows and associated regulative attempts, which we
have conceptualized as quasi-regimes. Particularly
important are effects upon those actors who are not
central to the existing regime. For example, the conse-
quences of present regulative practices for the non-oil-
producing countries need to be examined, in addition to
the effects upon both producers and consumers. The higher
order consequences of increased petroleum prices are
illustrative of the unanticipated consequences of existing
quasi-regimes. Alternative quasi-regimes beyond crisis-
handling coordination efforts are not yet fully articulated,
Maxim 4
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Maxim 5
Maxim 6
Maxim 7
but delineating different preferred perspectives can be
undertaken from an assessment of stresses and strains
upon prevailing regime rules.
In the course of such investigations it is imperative that
different scientific traditions with different ideological
perspectives be taken into account. Such differences lead
to divergencies in definitions of reality and in evalutions
of the attendant energy "problems. " Thus, we have noted
that different participants in the present world energy sys-
tem define the is sues differently, draw upon different
scientific traditions, and propose different solutions.
Reality in those terms does indeed wear many guises.
"Expert" assessments of the world energy situation vary
considerably depending upon their geo-political perspective,
with the "crisis" being viewed differently from Washing-
ton, Paris, Teheran, Moscow, or Peking. The "true"
view is relational.
The intricate patterns of interdependence in the present
world petroleum system highlight the. extent to which one
nation's policies become the constraints of another. Thus,
the policies and actions undertaken by each state are to be
(and have been) systematically codified as a means of
identifying the ties that bind the participants in the world
petroleum system, their assessment of resource costs,
and trade-offs associated with alternative policies. Oppor-
tunity costs must be taken into account: but this is an area
in which there exist no systematic investigations, rendering
all existing studies fundamentally flawed.
Policy analyses pertaining to the world energy system must
take into account the structure of that system in terms of
its basic parameters, taking explicit account of the impact
of policy outcomes upon the external environment, most
notably upon production, consumption, and basic reserves.
Account must also be made of the policy impacts upon inter-
national organizations (such as OPEC) and upon the multi-
national corporations, most particularly in terms of the
factors that would constrain their respective behavior.
(One of the most important drawbacks of present paradigms
of policy analyses lies in their insensitivity to structural
configurations and to environmental constraints. The
present energy situation points to the criticality of examining
-67-
Maxim 8
Maxim 9
Maxim 10
multiple impacts. Thus, for example, any consumer
policy designed to "break up" the producer petroleum
cartel needs to be assessed in terms of its impact upon
the structure of the world petroleum system and the
unanticipated consequences that might make such a policy
extremely undesirable.)
It is increasingly apparent that the consumer countries no
longer control the world petroleum system, a considera-
tion that has come as a surprise to both the consumers and
the multinational corporations. This situation is a perfect
example of the myopic perspective generated by ignoring
the multiplicity of cross-state actors and their ability to
influence the structure of the world petroleum system.
Thus, it is imperative that a cross-state perspective be
formally interjected into the investigations so as to dampen
the purely state-centric Realpolitik view of international
politics that accords a dominant role to the consumers of
petroleum while downgrading the emerging position of the
producers.
Given the divergent goals, objectives, and policies of the
actors in the world petroleum system, it is imperative that
their own assessment of their situation and position be under-
taken in order to obtain an understanding of the issues as
they see them. Equally important is to obtain their sub-
jective assessment of the alternative world energy regimes,
both preferred and expected. In this fashion, it might be
possible to compensate for the ethnocentric perspective
that governs almost all existing research on the global
energy situation. Much of it is written by scholars in the
West who attribute their own assessment to the actors
involved and impose a systematic Western bias. (Similar
biases prevail in other areas of the world; few investigators
have obtained a macro-systemic view of the interests,
identities, and expectations of various actors.)
In viewing the world energy system and evaluating the func-
tions performed by its various components and by the parti-
cipants in it, it is necessary to delineate the actual pro-
cedures and rules of operation that lie at the basis of the
system. Thus, the actual "rules of the game" need to be
identified as well as those that are regarded as such but,
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Maxim 11
in reality, do not perform such a function. For example,
the multinational corporations interact with the producing
countries in agreed-upon fashion with acknowledged sub-
stantive and procedural methods. Indeed, the multi-
nationals are often accused of being the "tax collectors"
of the producer governments; this accusation points to the
existence of shared modes of behavior and mutually directed
expectations between the producer governments and the
multinationals and does not necessarily point to conscious
collusion. Distinguishing empirically between shared -
substantive and procedural operational rule structures on
the one hand and shared goals and objectives on the other
is an important aspect of such an investigation. The strains
and stresses placed upon operational rules of a system
must also be identified; stresses often provide important
indication of prospective or anticipated system change.
Thus, the present malaise, if not outright dissatisfaction,
with prevailing rules and regulations underlying the present
world petroleum system as expressed by all the participants
in that system, amounts to an important indication of a
regime in transition: the present quasi-regime may
gradually give way before a new, participatory, and con-
sensus-based world petroleum regime.
In any assessment of the prevailing structure at the base
of the world petroleum system, it is important not only to
determine its historical origins and its structural and
functional characteristics (much as has been done in
Volume II), but to develop empirically based specifications
of the important events and developments which have,
over time, shaped the historical situations. These events
and developments constitute the "memories" of system
actors, or the empirical scenarios which have provided
the background for prevailing ground rules, operational
codes, and regulative regimes. Thus, the gradual learning
process which OPEC has been engaged in over the past
decade has been based upon an examination of memory-
rich systems, generating collective memory systems
composed of past events and interactions with the consumer
countries and with the multinational corporations. Articu-
lating and specifying the contents of this "collective
memory" is a necessary requisite for an understanding of
the situational contents and processes which have given
rise to the present quasi-regime operative in the world
petroleum system.
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Maxim 12
Maxim 13
Maxim 14
In drawing conclusions among the preferred or expected
regimes to coordinate petroleum transactions, the investi-
gator needs to articulate and specify the attributes of
several competing regimes predicated on competing
preferences and priorities and designed on the basis of
different vantage points in the world petroleum system.
Thus, for example, present concerns with the high price
of petroleum have given rise to numerous proposals
regarding alternative price structures. None of these
are fully articulated, nor are their characteristics well
specified. More important, with few exceptions, they all
emanate from the consumer countries, rendering little
attention to the preferences and priorities of the producing
states. As a methodological imperative, the specification
of alternative futures needs to be made. At the very
least, such an effort would place the prevailing patterns
of interaction in sharper perspective and would assist in
delineating the possible alternatives more systematically
than would otherwise be the case. It would also draw
attention to alternatives that might not have been intuitively
obvious.
The analysis of interactions among the major actors in the
world petroleum system should be employed as input data
into the structuring of regime alternatives and analysis of
their implications and consequences. Transactions between
the corporations and the consumers during the decades of
the 1950s and 1960s have shaped the present world petro-
leum situation and have led to the formation of OPEC and
the attempts of the producer countries to change the quasi-
regime that prevailed prior to the formation of that organi-
zation. Historical practices of the multinationals provide
important clues into the rules and regulations that governed
the actual functioning of the world petroleum system,as an
analysis of these practices will provide insights into the
precedents that were employed and insights into departures
from such precedents. The analysis of historical practices
and precedents would enable a more rich and substantive
input into the design of alternative futures.
From the above follows the necessity of formulating explicit
design principles addressed to the structure of alternative
energy regimes predicated on alternatives rules and modes
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of procedure. The specification of such design principles
ought to be predicated on alternative definitions of "reality"
and their implications (both intended and unintended)
explicitly investigated.
Maxim 15 Each alternative regime ought to be accompanied by a
delineation of a set of sufficient conditions to make them
attainable and a specification of the plausibility and possibil-
ity of attaining each requisite condition. The parameters
of such designs are inevitably set by the structure of the
world-petroleum system and by its natural and social
environments. The policy environments define the options
available to each state and the plausibility of attaining
each option. Thus delineating the requisite conditions for
alternative regimes would take into account both the decision
systems involved as well as the structural and social
contexts.
Maxim 16 The design of interdependence alternatives must be accom-
panied by post-mortem analyses of past and perspective
regime practices. In the context of energy interdependence
such analysis would necessarily draw upon a careful record
of the developments that have occurred between the time
at which the real or alternative regimes were specified
and the time at which the post-mortem is to be undertaken.
Explicit provision for a lag structure in the research design
needs to be made. Thus, it would be possible to examine
the consequences of specific developments in the world
petroleum system and their effects upon the prevailing
coordination or regulation efforts at any point in time.
By inference it would also be possible to comment upon
their implications for alternative regimes.
Maxim 17 Interdependence relationships in the world energy system
need to be examined from a multiperspective and multi-
dimensional view, taking into account: (a) the efficiency
of petroleum production methods and methods of trans-
portation distribution; (b) the autonomy (or lack thereof)
of different actors, including the multinational corporations
and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries;
(c) the capacity and capability attributes of different
actors as well as of prevailing quasi-regimes.
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Maxim 18
Maxim 19
Maxim 20
The opportunity costs of alternative economic and political
arrangements confronting every nation need to be made -
explicit. Moreover, the value of alternative courses of
action must be articulated by the investigators, particu-
larly when possibilities for conflict or potentials for
cooperation exist. Any confrontation strategy between
consumers and producers, for example, needs to be
viewed in terms of the opportunity costs to each partici-
pant, particularly to the initiators. This is especially
relevant in situations in which the consumers might seek
to "break up the cartel. " They would invariably need to
take into account the costs incurred should the producers
decide to "blow up the wells. "
As part of the overall research design following the above
maxims, a clearly specified mix of judgmental, rational,
and complex causal assessments should be systematically
employed to obtain repeated comprehensive evaluations of
changing conditions in the international system and to
evaluate the implications of these conditions for the develop-
ment of alternative regimes or for the stresses and strains
that might be encountered by the prevailing quasi-regime.
This mix is critical. There is a need to go beyond largely
judgmental efforts used by the State Department in the past,
without losing their valid contributions. Even the Mesarovic-
Pestel models need improvement in this regard.
Public debate regarding the structure of regimes, the scien-
tific traditions at the bases of investigations of regimes,
and of the the international and national institutions designed
to govern interactions in a world petroleum system needs
to be encouraged. Developing both context and structure
for such debates involves recourse to procedures and
strategies not yet fully developed. But the criticality of
access to energy to all nations is such as to necessitate
active public involvement and public debate on evaluation,
assessment, design, and institutional issues. The struc-
ture of these debates will invariably be different from the
structure of the procedures noted here as methodological
maxims. But the mix of judgmental, empirical, historical,
and adversarial approaches would clearly be important
dimensions underlying the evolving structure and forum
of debate.
-72-
D. Generalizing the Above Approach
Having given a relatively detailed set of suggestions concerning
further research into energy interdependencies, it is not necessary
to illustrate in detail the research approach suggested by the present
volume. But it should be emphasized that the process of respecifying
(and adapting) the methodological maxims of Table 3 to other content
areas could be a profitable exercise. Thus the table may serve a
bureaucratic function as a relevance checklist to be used by the State
Department or other institutional actors funding, reviewing, or formu-
lating research. If our own experience with the dominant body of
economic- and engineering-oriented research on energy is a reliable
guide, we suspect much currently discussed research both within and
outside government is of limited "interdependence relevance" in the
terms of Table 3.
Within the larger content areas of the present study, we would
emphasize also the need for studies of commodity flows in similar
terms. The subject of commodity flows in the minerals area, discussed
in Appendix A of Volume I, cries for a more vigorous analysis along
the lines of the present chapter. Only by doing so, will governmental
officials have systematic evidence to use in discounting simplistic
arguments in current public debates about American "dependence" on
particular mineral suppliers.
Although not studied here in detail, information and resource
flows in the scientific and technological areas also strike us as especially
important areas for systematic interdependence research. Surely
these flows, and their potential alternatives, reflect as high a degree
of international dependence and interdependence as any of America's
economic community or security relations.
In sum, the major methodological recommendation of this volume
is the consistent application of a multifaceted, design-oriented approach
t- the analysis of partial global interdependencies.
